Unpacking the Jury Box by Klein, Kenneth S.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 47 | Issue 5 Article 3
1-1996
Unpacking the Jury Box
Kenneth S. Klein
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 47 Hastings L.J. 1325 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol47/iss5/3
Unpacking the Jury Box
by
KENNETH S. KLEiN*
The problem with democracy is that the wrong people vote.'
Introduction
The contemporary pressure for jury reform is based on a false
premise that in turn holds out the false promise of positive change.
This Article will identify an alternative source for our dissatisfaction
with the jury system and investigate the implications of this phenome-
non for the current jury reform discussion.
In these days where each month brings a new trial-of-the-century,
there is escalating public distrust of the value of the jury trial.2 The
conventional explanation lies in the increasing belief that the typical
jury is incapable of making the difficult decisions called for in many
* Assistant Professor of Law at New England School of Law. J.D. University of
Texas (1984), B.A. Rice University (1981). This Article is dedicated to the Honorable
Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr., who has for twenty years reminded the author that power
and integrity are not incompatible. The author is particularly grateful for the invaluable
assistance, comments, criticisms, and input of Professor Lisa M. Black of Roger Williams
University School of Law, and of the faculty and library staff of New England School of
Law. The author thanks the Dean and the Board of Trustees of New England School of
Law for the generous research stipend that helped make this Article possible. There were
numerous others who, through their efforts, helped improve this Article, including Profes-
sor Akhil Amar of Yale Law School, Professor Mark Brodin of Boston College School of
Law, the National Center for Justice, my research assistant Daniel Goldman, Professors
Peter Kostant and Matthew Harrington of Roger Williams School of Law, Professors Ke-
vin Cole and Michael Kelly of the University of San Diego School of Law, Professor Fran-
cisco Valdes of California Western School of Law and attorney Brian Foster of Gray, Cary,
Ware & Freidenreich.
1. This quote is apocryphally attributed to Thomas Jefferson in the wake of an elec-
tion defeat to George Washington, but no source exists to confirm the attribution.
2. Except where noted, this Article will not distinguish between civil and criminal
juries. An article by Professor Colleen Murphy describes how American jurisprudence's
questionable assumption of a theoretical dichotomy leads to a lack of an integrated theory
of jury authority, and she provides a compelling argument for such an integrated theory.
Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61
GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 723 (1993). Professor Murphy argues that to the extent there is
currently an incoherence in jury theory, this is a new development, as the Founders did
"not differentiate between civil and criminal juries." Id. at 742-43.
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trials. This explanation assumes first, that the "purpose" of juries is to
reach accurate verdicts for the litigants and for society, and second,
that juries are failing at the task.
Both assumptions are misplaced. The "purpose" of the jury sys-
tem is far more involved than simply efficient decision-making. More-
over, empirical evidence suggests that juries are at least as capable as
judges in reaching "accurate" decisions. This empirical evidence
strongly suggests that societal distrust of juries cannot be adequately
explained by the shortcomings of our jurors.
There is, however, another, more plausible dynamic that may be
responsible for public mistrust of juries. This dynamic is an outgrowth
of the increased diversity in our society and among our jurors-not
merely race and gender diversity, but social and economic diversity as
well. Individuals divide their world into "us" and "them."'3 Whenever
those with power over "us" include within their membership or con-
stituencies "them," "we" are uncomfortable and resistant. The mod-
ern perception of the jury is a manifestation of this dynamic. As the
diversity of our society and its jurors has increased to the point that
litigants can expect jurors unlike themselves, the pressure has risen to
restrict the power of juries.
The concept of a jury with restricted power varies greatly from
what the Founders envisioned when writing the Constitution. In the
Founders' time of greater homogeneity in society, the enemy of free-
dom was most likely to manifest in an unchecked tyrannical govern-
ment. The jury was conceived as the representative of the community
in the courtroom, the counterweight against the government's repre-
sentative, the judge. The Founders saw the jury as the most demo-
cratic institution, and they delegated to the jury power commensurate
with that vision.
The aftermath of the Civil War marked the emergence of a sec-
ond conception of the role of the jury, which instigated the first seri-
ous pressure for restricting the power of the jury. In the wake of the
Civil War, whether because of it or merely coincident with it, the ho-
mogeneity of those with "voice" in society began to erode, and the
jury began to reflect that diversity.
"Voice" is the term this Article will use to express the notion of
being a part of the political process. For example, from the beginning
3. See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Iden-
tity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of
Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95 (1990).
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of this nation, if a white male land owner felt aggrieved by the system,
he would have access to expressing displeasure and, to one degree or
another, might have the ability to do something to change the system.
As time has passed, more and more constituencies in society have
gained some degree of access to power and influence in the political
milieu. This access is what this Article means by "voice."
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the diversity of constituencies
with voice expanded. The traditionally powerful constituencies in so-
ciety could no longer rely on receiving a jury made up of those most
like themselves, and consequently began to distrust the jury. These
traditional constituencies generated reforms designed to restrict the
power of juries, in order to protect their interests in the face of a po-
tentially less sympathetic or outright hostile jury.
Today, there is a third evolution in our conception of the role of
the jury. Although similar in theory to the Founders' original vision,
this model creates tension when applied in a contemporary context.
The diversity of jurors continues to increase, and so too does the di-
versity of constituencies with voice in the community. As a result,
there inevitably can be some constituency with the power to protest
effectively, rejecting virtually any verdict a jury reaches in a case. The
jury cannot satisfy all constituencies because the jury is expected to
represent the entire spectrum of often discordant voices in the com-
munity, yet reach a verdict that the entire community can view as "ac-
curate." The jury is doomed under this scenario to a perception that it
is failing, and the pressure for jury reform is predictably intense.
Because the contemporary expression of dissatisfaction with ju-
ries, however, has focused on the perceived shortcomings of juries in
reaching accurate verdicts, rather than on the tension caused by in-
creased diversity in the community and in the jury, the suggestions for
jury reform are flawed. Virtually every one of these reforms is corro-
sive to the democratic functions of the jury. Because the reforms can-
not be justified on the basis of more accurate verdicts, the reforms
bear special scrutiny as potentially anti-democratic.
For this reason, the continuing pressure for reform will test the
dedication we have to the democratic ideal. It was easy to talk of
democracy at the founding of the nation-there was no diversity
among the empowered segments of society or the citizens eligible for
jury service.4 Today's diversity will test the courage of these convic-
4. See FRANcis H. HELER, THE Sixm AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNrTD STATES: A STUDY IN CONsTTONAL DEVELOPMENT 16-24 (1951); CHILTON
WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, at 92-
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tions. This Article looks beyond the simplistic accusation of jury in-
competence and the panacea of reforms that have been derived from
that accusation, and measures those reforms against the idea of the
jury as a democratic institution to identify which reforms promote
more voice in the discussion and which reforms silence diversity of
voices.
5
I. Diversity as a Cause of Contemporary Distrust of Juries
A. The Theory: Diversity Has Led To Distrust
Are juries broken?
Perhaps the logical starting point for addressing this question is a
recognition that, for the most part, it is still widely acknowledged that
juries do much that is right. Most of the debate is about how well
juries work. Much less debate exists about the integrity of jurors.6
There does not appear to be any general suspicion that jurors are rou-
tinely bribed, intimidated, or otherwise compromised.7 This fact
alone is a remarkable tribute to either the strength of the American
social contract or the naivete of our belief that juries are doing their
137 (1960). Accord William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Mar-
shall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 918 n.140 (1978); JAMES P. LE-
VINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 24 (1992).
5. This analysis synthesizes three threads in contemporary writing on juries. Many
scholars have focused on possible structural reforms to the jury. See Martin A. Kotler,
Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123, 134 (1985); Mark S.
Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-The Case for
the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15 (1990). Others have tried to refocus on how the
legal doctrines have strayed from the original conception of juries as political, not civil,
rights. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131
(1991); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin To Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995). Still others have postulated that perceptions of the jury have
changed as women have gained greater access to the jury box, and that the institution of
the jury can be viewed as a reflection of society's gender and racial attitudes. See Laura
Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil
Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory
Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (1995).
6. See Rita James Simon, The American Jury: Instrument of Justice or of Prejudice
and Conformity?, in SOCIAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL PROCESS 254,290 (Harry M. Johnson ed.,
1978) (a fifty-year review of political trials in America reinforces the conclusion of jury
integrity).
7. This has not uniformly been the case in America. In the nineteenth century there
was much more comment about the disreputable types of persons who served on juries,
and the possibility that engendered for corrupt jurors. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 880-
82 (1994).
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best to do the right thing. Indeed, some still see the jury as "a cultural
icon as revered in the United States as the flag."
8
So from where does the perception of a "broken" jury come? Is
it coincidence that as the jury has become the most racially and gen-
der diverse of our institutions of governance, 9 the public has become
suspicious of its efficacy? 10 On the other hand, is the suspicion of ju-
ries really unrelated to the protection of juror diversity, and instead a
reflection of the increasing likelihood that any given jury is not chosen
to be representative of the community and its diversity, but rather is
chosen in the hope that individual jurors are biased?"
There are certainly vocal segments of our society that believe that
they are genuinely and specifically abused by juries. When a jury ac-
quits a notorious defendant, the press and the "experts" declaim the
outcome.' 2 When a million dollar verdict is returned against
McDonalds, there is an outcry from the business community and Con-
gress. The American Medical Association describes malpractice suits
as out of control. The insurance industry decries the rewards of dam-
ages by juries. The business community wants restrictions on products
liability and director liability.' 3 Women question the adequacy of ver-
dicts in spousal abuse cases. Afican-Americans take to the streets of
Los Angeles in the wake of an acquittal of officers charged with ille-
gally beating Rodney King. Each of these groups is a constituency
8. Dooley, supra note 5, at 325.
9. l at 325-26.
10. Md at 325-27. Professor Dooley's essay explicitly takes on the question of whether
the increasing procedural restraints on juries are a manifestation of sexism. She makes an
interesting and compelling argument that there is increasingly demeaning language
describing juries, increasing procedural disempowerment of juries, and generally increasing
lack of respect for juries, all precisely paralleling the increasing gender diversity of the jury
panel.
11. See e.g., PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 113 (1984) ("[attorneys] want people
who have some disposition, some tilt, toward their client, or who can be tilted"). Ironi-
cally, the earliest juries, those of medieval England, were composed of persons chosen not
because of their lack of bias but rather because they had knowledge of one sort or another
(familiarity with the parties, place, or customs) that directly pertained to the case at hand.
See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 23-24 (1986); Dooley, supra
note 5, and notes 114-15. The trial of Aaron Burr appears to be a catalyst in American
jurisprudence toward impartial juries. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) No. 14,692. An article detailing how contemporary advocates use the jury selec-
tion process to undercut the goal of an impartial, unbiased, and arguably qualified jury is
found in Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans
Conspiracy Trial, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RaS. J. 151, 158-61.
12. For anecdotal cases of the jury surprising the experts with its verdicts, see JEFRY
ABRAMSON, WE, Ta JURY 5 (1994).
13. Another indicia of the business community's dissatisfaction with the jury system is
the dramatic rise in Alternative Dispute Resolution.
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with influence in our society. Perhaps thinking of them as constituent
parts of a larger community provides a clue to the dissatisfaction with
the jury system.
The American community has a variety of constituencies. All, or
virtually all, of these constituencies have interests at stake in the jus-
tice system at some time or another.14 Yet, at any given moment, only
some of these constituencies have a "voice" in the public conversa-
tion.' 5 The history of juries and of America reflects a correlation be-
tween diversity of voices and jurors on the one hand, and
dissatisfaction with juries on the other.
This correlation is the heart of what this Article will call a "con-
stituency theory." The basic thesis is that anyone with the ability to
exert pressure on a system will use that pressure to maximize the
probability that the system will yield a favorable outcome to him or
herself. This is especially so in political systems; groups, once self-
identified, distrust nonmembers, and will use political power to pro-
tect themselves from the possible influence of those nonmembers.' 6 If
diversity begins to characterize a political institution, there will be
pressure to minimize the influence of that institution.' 7
A constituency theory highlights two roles that diversity can have
in causing pressure to reform juries. First, if diversity of constituen-
cies in the jury pool increases, then the probability that potential ju-
rors will have different values from potential litigants also increases.
Because some of those litigants will have voice, they can be expected
to pressure for jury reform to minimize the probability that the jury
system can yield unwanted results. For example, the first one hundred
years of the American jury brought a steadily increasing restriction of
the jury's role and power as commercial interests increasingly found
the jury uncertain and unpredictable. 18
14. For example, a slave in America in 1799 had no political status but certainly had
the potential to have interests (such as his ownership) subject to resolution by the justice
system.
15. Professor Karst argues that, "[f]rom the earliest times, some people were included
as full participants in the society's public life while others were not." Karst, Paths to Be-
longing: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, supra note 3, at 370.
16. Id. at 309-11.
17. See, e.g., id. at 346-51 (detailing how as diversity increased among those who vote,
the reaction was to either make exercise of the franchise more difficult or to minimize the
influence marginalized voters could exert).
18. MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
28-29, 84-85, 141-43, 228 (1992). The pressure for reform can even change the terminology
in which the jury is described. For example, as the civil jury has become more diverse (and
in particular, as it has become inclusive of women), the rhetoric about juries has increas-
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
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Second, even if the diversity of the jury pool is static, the poten-
tial for difference between the values of the jury and the litigant will
more often lead to calls for jury reform as the diversity of society's
constituencies with voice increases. A diverse constituency with voice
will try to use that voice to gain protected inclusion in the jury. If
successful, then the reaction of "establishment" voices will be to try to
disempower the newly diverse jury. Also, the new voices in the com-
munity will use those voices to attack the jury.19 If the diverse constit-
uency with voice is unsuccessful, then individuals from the
constituency will conclude that they are excluded from the jury be-
cause they might bring diverse viewpoints, and "they may conclude
that a system that engages in such exclusion is not a system that can be
fair to them." 20 They too, then, will agitate for a restricted jury role.
21
Measured either by the diversity of constituencies with voice or by the
diversity of constituencies with access to the jury pool, increased di-
versity will lead to increased pressure to minimize the role and power
of the jury.
There is a difference between evaluating constituencies according
to whether they have voice, versus whether they have wealth. Politics
in general, and thus the politics of receiving the benefits of govern-
ment resources, "typically has been the province of the 'haves."'
22
The "haves" can hold great power. Status as a "have-not," however, is
not equivalent to an inability to bring pressure on the system.
Those with voice can have influence even if they are not among
the "haves." Consider the pressure brought to bear by the voices of
the "have-nots" of Los Angeles in the wake of the acquittal of police
officers charged with the illegal beating of Rodney King.z3 This inci-
dent amply demonstrates that when the marginalized groups of soci-
ingly adopted the same derogatory terms often used to derogate women. Dooley, supra
note 5, at 331. ("Society's ambivalence about the competence and usefulness of juries is
both a manifestation of and a metaphor for society's ambivalence about women and about
what is perceived as a feminine approach to decision-making.").
19. The obvious example is the civil unrest in Los Angeles in the wake of the acquittal
of the officers accused of illegally beating Rodney King.
20. Marder, supra note 5, at 1084.
21. See, eg., Roy L. Brooks, A Critical Race Theory Critique of the Right To a Jury
Trial Under Title VII, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & Ptm. POL'Y 159, 166-67 (1993) (arguing against a
recent expansion of jury rights in Title VII cases because the jury is racist, and thus delays
justice).
22. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, supra note 3, at 22. Here, "haves" re-
fers to wealth, not "voice."
23. See HANS & VIMAR, supra note 11, at 51, 248 (postulating how the reaction of
the African-American community to the acquittal of the four police officers in the killing
of a black salesman in Miami might have differed if the jury had been African-American);
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ety seek inclusion this may cause the "haves" to fear and react.24 It
will cause reaction in the instances when the "have-nots" have voice
and use that voice to agitate for change.25 The same theory might also
explain the current general discontent with the justice system and an
even broader distrust of all of government. One can certainly plausi-
bly postulate that as part of contemporary, generic dissatisfaction with
government, today's public holds a perception that the Presidency is
flawed because it does not preside (it does not produce leadership),
the Legislature is flawed because it does not legislate (it is not respon-
sive), and the Judiciary is flawed because it is not just (verdicts make
no sense). 2
6
In an inverted way, constituency theory is supported by a body of
empirical research on prejudice by juries. This research repeatedly
demonstrated that "juries selected with prejudice deliberated with
prejudice." 27 Although this behavior may be offensive, it supports the
core notion of constituency theory: that parties to litigation believe
homogeneity leads to predictability. If predictability is highly valued
by litigants, then there will be less comfort with juries if they are more
likely to be heterogeneous.
This constituency explanation of the interrelationship of the
power and perception of the jury can be expressed in a variety of
ways-even while not using the language of constituency theory. For
example, one might assert that the degree of pressure to restrict the
power of the jury is related to the degree of predictability of verdicts
as perceived by the business community, which in turn is reflective of
the likelihood that a jury will reflect a predictable set of community
values.28 This is likely merely a restatement of what constituency the-
accord Brooks, supra note 21, at 165 ("The Rodney King verdict is the most visible but not
the only instance of racism in the jury box.").
24. See Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, supra note 3, at 24-30. "When a
subordinated group challenges a dominant community of meaning, those expressions are
bound to arouse strong emotions, for they threaten the individual identities of the people
who live inside the boundaries of the dominant culture." Karst, Boundaries and Reasons:
Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, supra note 3, at 96.
25. See generally DIPERNA, supra note 11, at 96. ("[I]f the larger community becomes
increasingly polarized over economic and social issues ... the community's cross section,
the jury, is likely to be more polarized. Community values then may not only be more
operative in the jury deliberations room, they could become decisive.").
26. See generally DIPERNA, supra note 11, at 56 ("When the ancients received bad
news, they sometimes put the messenger bearing it to death. Rising crime is bad news, so
are the inefficiencies of the justice system.").
27. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 110-11.
28. See Kotler, supra note 5, at 152-53; see also HoRWrrZ, supra note 18, at 226-28.
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ory would predict-that diversity of race and gender inevitably leads
to lack of confidence in juries.
The instinctive interpretation of recent high profile trials is con-
sistent with constituency theory. The public largely expected a hung
jury in the O.J. Simpson trial because both the defendant and a major-
ity of the jurors were African-American. 29 When the jury acquitted,
the predominant interpretation was that race explained the verdict.30
As discussed earlier, both of the verdicts in the so-called Rodney King
beating trials were in accord with public expectations based upon pre-
dicting the behavior of a white jury and a largely African-American
jury.31 The first juries in the trials of Lyle and Erik Menendez
(charged with the murder of their parents) divided on largely gender
lines-male jurors rejected the defense's position while women jurors
found the defense position more persuasive-and this seemed a plau-
sible if not acceptable explanation of the verdicts.32 These trials ex-
emplify the kind of results critics use to justify their dissatisfaction
with the justice system. The pattern here is stark. If we do not "like"
the verdict, we are quick to question the fairness of a jury based on
diversity, and slow to consider the possibility that the jury may have
had valid reasons for its decision.33 Diversity leads to distrust.3 4
29. See, ag., Many Defense Lawyers Are Predicting At Least One Hung Jury in Simp-
son Trial, NEw YORK Tir=s, April 9, 1995, at 14A; Dave Lesher, Wilson Backs Amend-.
ment on Non-Unanimous Juries Legislation, L.A. Trmns, July 18, 1995, at Al (reporting on
the California Governor's proposal for jury reform based on the expectation of a hung
jury). Indeed, the news articles in the wake of the Simpson verdict provide strong anecdo-
tal evidence of how diversity distorts public perceptions of the jury. While the predomi-
nant external influence on the outcome of that trial was almost certainly money, the public
dissatisfaction with the verdict was expressed almost exclusively in terms of race.
30. See, e.g., Scott Shepard, The Simpson Verdict: The Impact, ATLANTA JOURNAL
AND CONSTITUTION, Oct. 4, 1995 at C6; After the Simpson Verdict, ST. Louis POST-DIs-
PATC H, Oct. 4, 1995, at 6B; Thomas Sowell, Disgust is Widespread, ATLANTA JOURNAL
AND CONsTrrUTroN, Oct. 5,1995 at 18A; Mary McGrory, Views From the Jury Box, WASH-
INGTON POST, Oct. 5, 1995, at A2.
31. See generally Mark Hansen, Different Jury, Different Verdict?: A Rehearing On
Change of Venue, 78 A.B.A. J., 54 Aug. 1992, at 54 (discussing proposed legislation requir-
ing consideration of demographics in venue-changing proceedings).
32. See Maura Dolan, Jury Is Out on the Role of Gender, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at
Al; Maura Dolan, Why Jurors Err: They're Just Human, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25,1994, at Al;
Dooley, supra note 5, at 330 n.21.
33. See generally Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Pub-
lic Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L.
R:v. 1177 (1994).
34. This Article should not be read as arguing that constituency theory provides a
single, definitive explanation of the current perception of the jury. Other dynamics are
certainly also at work, including the expense of jury trials and the general distrust of gov-
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In sum, under a constituency theory, the current dissatisfaction
with the jury is not so much an outgrowth of some diminished capacity
of the jury to answer the questions asked of them-either because the
jury is less capable or because the questions have become too hard-
but rather is an outgrowth of the expansion in our society of those
who have a voice in commenting on or serving on the jury.
35
B. The Proof: Testing the Constituency Theory Against the Historical
Evidence
The constituency theory of juries assumes that there is a correla-
tion between diversity and dissatisfaction. One test of the theory,
therefore, is to see if historically this correlation exists.
The concept of the American jury has been evolving over the past
200 years.36 At the beginning of the nation, local juries enjoyed a rep-
utation for doing justice that they would never have again. 37 The
power of the jury soon contracted. The Civil War presaged a time of
increasing diversity in society and in the jury. Likewise, while the
"jury entered the nineteenth century as a body authorized to resolve
contested points of law on its own ... [t]he jury exited the century
duty-bound to follow judicial instructions. ' 38 The "rhetorical assump-
tion of reasonableness began to erode... [and] procedural restraints
on jury power began to develop. '39 Today, diversity of jurors and
voices is even more dramatic. Not surprisingly then, for the civil jury
in the twentieth century, "the paradigm shift is complete: the earlier
assumption of the reasonableness of juries has been replaced with the
assumption that juries are unreasonable. '40
eminent institutions. However, constituency theory, if valid, is a largely overlooked, and
potentially predominant, dynamic.
35. One of the most striking recent events implicitly recognizing something like a con-
stituency theory of juries is that Los Angeles County will hold "cultural diversity" work-
shops to sensitize "Juror Service Personnel" to how cultural values can influence how
jurors of diverse backgrounds react to them. Juror Services Division of the Superior Court,
The Jury Report: A Blueprint for Change in the Los Angeles County Jury System, App. D
(1995).
36. The reference here to the "American" institution of the jury is a restrictive refer-
ence, indicating that the scope of the Article is only on the jury in America. It is worth
noting "that 80% of all jury trials worldwide take place in the United States." HANS &
VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 31.
37. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 36.
38. Id. at 37.
39. Dooley, supra note 5, at 337.
40. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
UNPACKING THE JURY BOX
(1) The Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Jury
(a) The Constituencies of the Jury Pool and the Community
Late eighteenth and early nineteenth century America was a time
of homogeneity of the community of jurors and voices. In 1790,
whites constituted approximately 81% of the total population,41 92%
of the remaining population were slaves.42 In 1850, 84% of the popu-
lation was white, with slaves making up 88% of the remainder.43 In
other words, throughout this period whites constituted approximately
98% of the "free" population-the population with "voice."
The white population itself was remarkably homogenous. In
1790, 92% (as indicated by the surname of the head of the family) of
the entire white population was from the British Isles.44 During this
period, only men could vote. Indeed, in the early days of America,
women were virtually excluded from all forms of participation in pub-
lic life and, not surprisingly, essentially had no voice.45
In eighteenth century America, great debate ensued over how ge-
ographically local a juror had to be.46 This debate is reflected in the
eventual language of the Sixth Amendment.47 But this discussion of
the possible diversity of the juror pool was very limited. Jurors were
white males with appropriate property, suffrage, or religious qualifica-
tions.48 The potential jury pool was, as a result, approximately three-
quarters of the adult-male, Caucasian population of the United
States.49 Even the most vocal proponents of a democratic jury, the
Anti-Federalists, accepted this situation.50 Simply put, in the nascent
years of the nation, only white men had voice, and only white men
were jurors. "Diversity" was not a pertinent term of discussion.
41. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, A CENTURY
OF POPULATION GROWTH 1790-1900, at 80, 82 (1909).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 116.
45. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of
Groups, supra note 3, at 129-32.
46. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 22-36.
47. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
48. HELLER, supra note 4, at 16-24; WILLtAMSON, supra note 4, at 92-137. Accord
LEvINE, supra note 4, at 24; Nelson, supra note 4, at 918 n.140.
49. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 877-78.
50. Cecilia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith. The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Rep-
resentative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 43 (1955).
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(b) The Expressions of the Role and Scope of the Jury
A constituency theory of juries would predict that during the
early years of this nation, the reverence for the jury as an institution
and the power given to the jury would be the greatest possible. Diver-
sity was low both among voices and jurors, and so trust would be cor-
relatively high.
Importantly, the vision of the jury during this period, whatever
that vision was, would be the vision held at the time the jury became
constitutionally protected. If it is true that the contemporary jury is
not over matched, i.e. the jury is capable of handling the tasks the
system asks the jury to perform, and a constituency theory is a better
explanation of the current distrust of the jury, then it is this original
vision of the jury that is put at risk, perhaps even inadvertently, by
current jury reform proposals. This history then bears close examina-
tion, because it defines both the role of the jury in democracy and the
degree to which current concepts of the jury threaten that role.
For many citizens in eighteenth century America, juries were
viewed not so much as a civil right of the litigants, but as a populist or
political right of the jurors.5' In the mid- and late eighteenth century
America, the institution of the jury52 was perceived as one of the most
important of political rights.5 3 Criminal juries are unique as the only
51. See, e.g, Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, supra note 5, at 1187-89;
Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U. C. DAVis L. REV.
1169, 1169-73 (1995). As Professor Amar points out, one of the most dramatic illustrations
that jury rights were rights of jurors, not litigants, is the Constitution's description of jury
rights in criminal cases, which if read literally, requires a jury in all criminal cases whether
or not the defendant wants a jury trial. Id- at 1181. The point is well taken even if one
accepts the argument of others that the clause cannot be read literally. Felix Frankfurter &
Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by
Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 969 (1926). Even if the clause is read as giving the defendant
an option, Professor Langbein argues that one of the more "spectacular failure[s]" of the
Bill of Rights is the "astonishing discrepancy" between the Bill of Rights promise of a jury
trial in all criminal cases and what the criminal justice system delivers. John H. Langbein,
On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 119, 120 (1992). Even putting aside this particular debate, however,
it is possible to read the entire Bill of Rights, not just the Sixth and Seventh Amendment,
as expressions of populism. See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 5;
but see Robert C. Palmer, Akhil Amar: Elitist Populist and Anti-textual Textualist, 16 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 397 (1992).
52. In their thinking about the role and importance of juries, the Founders did not
differentiate between civil and criminal juries. Murphy, supra note 2, at 742-43.
53. Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, supra note 51, at 1169. Profes-
sor Amar summarizes some of the more obvious indicia of the primacy early Americans
placed on jury rights:
The only right secured in all state constitutions penned between 1776 and 1787
was the right of jury trial in criminal cases. The criminal jury was one of only a
1336 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
guarantee to appear in both the original text of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights.54 Civil juries were not mentioned in the text of the
Constitution that the states considered when debating ratification,55
and this absence almost caused the rejection of the Constitution.56 In-
deed, the ratification debates reveal dramatically the original vision of
the role and power of the jury.
The Anti-Federalists viewed the jury in a broad context, not just
as a part of the mechanism of trying cases, but as an integral compo-
nent of democratic self-government. 57 Through jury service, citizens
would participate "both. in making and executing the laws."' 58 The
Anti-Federalists argued that citizens, by their participation on juries,
were afforded the ability to change the nature of government.59 One
of the delegates to the Federal Convention, Elbridge Gerry, said the
jury was "adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other [sys-
tem] the world can produce. '60 In the rhetoric of the time, the Anti-
Federalists contended that a citizen's right to influence government
through jury service was more necessary than his right to be repre-
handful of rights explicitly affirmed in the Philadelphia Convention (in Article
III); and the Convention's only discussion of whether to add a more elaborate Bill
of Rights took place in response to concerns about protecting civil juries. When
the Convention imprudently omitted such a Bill, Anti-Federalists pounced on the
omission during the ratification debates; and jury-protection clauses topped their
wish lists. Of the six state ratifying conventions that floated amendment ideas,
five put forth two or more explicit-jury proposals.
Id. at 1169-70. Ultimately, a total of six states proposed language protecting civil jury
rights. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, H.R. Doc.
No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1019, 1026, 1029, 1036, 1046, 1054 (1925). Civil juries were
first protected in America as early as 1641 in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, section
29. 1 THE BiLL OF RiGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HISrORY 75 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971).
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2, and amend. VI. Of the twelve states that enacted
written constitutions prior to the Federal Convention, the only right all twelve declared
unanimously was the right to a criminal jury. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 870.
55. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN ION OF 1787, at 587-88 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
56. Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Civil Jury Trial, 53 Omo ST. LJ. 1005, 1008-10 (1992); Edith Guild Henderson, The
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289, 295-99 (1966); Charles W.
Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639,
667-725 (1973); JoHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 31 (1988).
57. Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin To Voting, supra note 5, at 218.
58. Letters from the Federal Farmer (XV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANn-FED-
ERALST 315, 320 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981).
59. Id. at 315.
60. Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and
State Conventions, in PAMPNHLES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTrED STATES 1, 10
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1788).
July/August 1996] UNPACKING THE JURY BOX
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
sented in the legislature. 61 Thus, as one historian summarizes, one
reason the Anti-Federalists so valued juries was as a means of increas-
ing "the role of the people in the administration of government.
'62
This theme preceded the debate between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists over ratification.63 In the first half of the eighteenth cen-
tury, several sensational trials, most notably the trial of John Peter
Zenger, illustrated to Americans that juries were a critical tool in im-
posing popular will over the tyranny of government. 64 The Declara-
tion of Independence made allusion to this role of juries by raising
against King George II a grievance for "depriving us... of the bene-
fits of trial by jury. ' 65 During the Federal Convention, Thomas Jeffer-
son, who was then in France, wrote that he considered trial by jury
"the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by which a government
can be held to the principles of it's [sic] constitution. ' 66 Indeed, Jef-
ferson concluded, "Were I called upon to decide whether the people
had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I
61. Essays by a Farmer (IV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245,
249 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981). In a similar vein, one Anti-Federalist wrote:
It is essential in every free country, that the common people should have a part
and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative department.
The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collection of the people
by their representatives in the legislature ... have procured for them, in this
country, their true proportion of influence.
Letters From the Federal Farmer (IV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
249-50. Professor Akhil Amar points out the irony of contemporary jury selection
processes trying to weed out competent potential jurors, and the original conception of
juries as analogous to legislatures: "We do not try ... to pick the most stupid persons
imaginable to serve in our legislatures, or on our judiciary." Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten
Suggested Reforms, supra note 51, at 1182.
62. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 19 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). A compel-
ling article comprehensively arguing that jury rights, because of the focus on the value of
jury service to the jurors as opposed to the litigants, are political rights akin to the right to
vote, not civil rights, is Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin To Voting, supra
note 5.
63. See, e.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 107 (5th ed. 1956) ("Ever since the seventeenth century when juries began to express
sentiments against the government, there has been a tendency for the jury to become, at
least in popular thought, a safeguard of political liberty.").
64. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 871-74 (1994); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra
note 11, at 32-36. Indeed, the trial of Zenger and the central role the jury played in his
acquittal (and the view that his acquittal represented a populist rejection of government
tyranny) was a theme in one of the Anti-Federalist attacks on the proposed Constitution's
inadequate protection of jury rights. Essays by Cincinnatus (I), reprinted in 6 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 7 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
65. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 266, 269.
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would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative." 67 Luther
Martin, a Federal Convention delegate, argued that "jury trials
[have] ... long been considered the surest barrier against arbitrary
power. '68 A Virginia newspaper in 1788 characterized juries as a "sa-
cred barrier against injustice... [through] the administration of public
justice. '69 John Dickinson called juries a "heaven-taught institu-
tion, ' 70 one of the "comer stones of liberty."'71
Along a similar vein, juries served as a means to educate the peo-
ple. As one commentator has written, the notion was that jurors
would "learn self-government by doing self-government. '72 Alexis
De Tocqueville gleaned the same impression of the reason Americans
so valued juries. De Tocqueville wrote:
[The jury] should be regarded as a free school which is always open
and in which each juror learns his rights .... I do not know whether
a jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those
who have to decide the case. I regard it as one of the most effective
means of popular education at society's disposal.73
Other populist rationales for juries surfaced in the arguments sur-
rounding the ratification of the Constitution. Juries were regarded as
a means for citizens to "thwart the excesses of powerful and overly
ambitious government officials." 74 Again, De Tocqueville gave ex-
pression to this theme:
The institution of the jury... places the real direction of society in
the hands of the governed .... The jury system as it is understood in
67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 283. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Anti-Federalists.
See Essays By a Farmer (IV), supra note 61, at 36-38.
68. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENI-ON OF 1787, supra note 55, at 221-22.
69. Essays By the Impartial Examiner (I), reprinted in 5 Tim COwMLETE An-FEDER-
ALIST 172, 182-83 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
70. John Dickinson, The Letter of Fabius, in 1788, on the Federal Constitution (IV), in
2 THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 794,797 (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).
71. Id. at 798.
72. Amar, Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 5, at 1187.
73. ALEXIS DE TocQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 296 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945). In 1872, another French commentator made the identical point. See H. Helbronner,
Le Pouvoir Judiciaire Aux Etats-Unis: Son Organisation et Ses Attributions, translated and
quoted in Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury His-
tory, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERIcA: A CRITCAL OVERVIEW 23,40 (Rita James Simon
ed., 1975). Within the last few years, a federal judge made the same point in an essay when
he wrote that jury service is still a good community exercise in teaching citizens how gov-
ernment works. James H. Michael, Jr., The Right to Trial by Jury: How Important?, 27
TRIAL, Oct. 1991, at 16, 18. See also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 249 (contempo-
rary jurors consistently report that jury service is an educational experience).
74. Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin To Voting, supra note 5, at 218
(citing Amar, Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 5, at 1183 (1991)).
July/August 1996] UNPACKING THE JURY BOX 1339
America appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a conse-
quence of sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.
75
Indeed, the text of the Sixth Amendment emphasizes this point.
Under this Amendment, the juror, as counterweight to the national
government, had to be drawn from the local community of the de-
fendant.76 This structure effectively provided for local citizen over-
sight of a potentially overbearing and non-local government.77
For some, their support of the jury as an institution was based on
a more narrow aspect of the theme of checking government; in gen-
eral, the jury alone could serve as a check on the otherwise unfettered
authority of judges.78 As one Anti-Federalist writer explained, jurors
"frequently drawn from the body of the people... secure to the peo-
ple at large, their just and rightful controul [sic] in the judicial depart-
ment."79 Thus, the jury "was viewed as a means of controlling judges'
discretion and restraining their possible arbitrary tendencies."8 0
Juries were also a means to stop dishonest government. As one
writer of the time remarked, "I would rather trust my life, liberty and
property to a verdict of twelve of my honest neighbours [sic], than to
the opinion of any great man in the world, for great men are not al-
ways honest men."'81 Given this history, it is not surprising that James
Madison ultimately found a way to craft acceptable language in the
Bill of Rights guaranteeing the right to trial by jury.82
75. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 73, at 293-94.
76. See supra note 47.
77. See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 5, at 1186.
78. Essays by a Farmer, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 9, 14 (Herbert J. Stor-
ing ed., 1981) ("no remedy has been yet found equal to the task of deterring and curbing
the insolence of office, but a jury").
79. Letters From The Federal Farmer (XV), supra note 58, at 320.
80. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 20-21 (1975).
81. Letters From a Countryman, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 69,
73 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
82. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI and VII. That Madison would be the author of the con-
summate political compromise is within character. A biographer of Madison characterizes
him as one of the two constructive statesmen of the Federal Convention, leading the draft-
ing through compromise. IRVING BRYANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 1787-1800, at 156-57 (1950).
Yet the need for compromise was not because the Federalists had a different vision of
juries from the Anti-Federalists. The Federalists did not omit the right to a civil jury from
the Constitution because they opposed it, but because of their perception of the impossibil-
ity of defining the right without contradicting too many forms of existing practice. THE
FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton); Letter from George Washington to Marquis de
Lafayette (April 28, 1788), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON at 478-79 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
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Expressions of near-reverence for the jury are found well into the
next century. In 1842, when the Pennsylvania legislature was debating
restricting the judicial right to evaluate facts, Representative Deford
supported such a limit because "judicial tyranny... was [approaching]
unseen, with the stealthiness of a midnight assassin .... It is to the jury
of the country we look for the protection of all that is dear to us."'8 3 In
1879, according to the journal The Western Jurist, juries were needed
because judicial power "without checks and limitations, invariably be-
comes tyrannical, supercilious and mischievous."' 4 Indeed, restricting
judges from commenting on the evidence was necessary because,
among other reasons, "in large cities [juries] do not usually know
either the parties or their counsel . . . [but] the intimacy between
bench and bar" favored "entrenched" advocates.8 5 Thus, well into the
nineteenth century, juries were still thought of in populist terms, as
the great safeguard of the citizenry.
8 6
In summary, the events of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century are in accord with the prediction of constituency the-
ory. At the time of the formation of the nation, the voices heard were
the white male landowners who were the catalysts of the revolution,
the authors of the Constitution, and the new officials populating all
levels of government. Although these men had innumerable disagree-
ments over the procedural details of jury practice and the language
necessary to protect jury rights, they were the only voices heard with
interests at stake in jury trials, and they were the only voices in the
jury room. In other words, no appreciable diversity existed among the
constituencies with a voice in the conversation and a seat in the jury
box. Constituency theory would expect, and history confirms, this was
a time when the role and power of juries was expansive and revered.
(2) The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Jury
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, diversity
increased both among the voices in the community and the members
of the jury pool. Thus, the constituency theory would suggest that this
period marked the beginning of the period in which "the jury gained a
reputation for relinquishing its role as a champion of justice and a
bulwark against oppressive government... [and in which] many of the
83. Deford, Trial By Jury, 1 PA. LU. 99, 101 (1842).
84. Edward P. Wilder, Trial of Issues of Fact-Jury v. Judges, W. JURIST 391, 395
(1879).
85. 1& at 393.
86. See State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54, 77 (1877).
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current attacks on the integrity of the jury originated." 87 In other
words, as the diversity of the jury increased, so too did dissatisfaction
within it. In this period, the jury experienced a "rapid fall from
grace, 88 largely under the banner of the need for predictability.
89
(a) The Constituencies of the Jury Pool and the Community
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century began an open-
ing of the jury box and an expansion of voices in the community. Cer-
tainly diversity increased in the jury pool. Property holding
requirements diminished.90 In 1880, the Supreme Court held that de-
liberate exclusion of African-American jurors in the trial of an Afri-
can-American defendant violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.91 Although this holding did not immediately
alter the diversity of the jury because the Court set an extremely high
standard for demonstrating discriminatory intent,92 by 1935, the
Court's holding that a showing of "systematic exclusion" 93 would suf-
fice helped open the jury box further in all areas but the South.
94
This same period of time also marked the opening of the jury box
to women. Before this, women were largely prohibited from serving
as jurors based on the reasoning summarized by the oft-quoted re-
mark of Sir William Blackstone that women were disqualified "on ac-
count of the defect of sex."95 In 1870, Wyoming became the first state
to include women in the jury pool. 96 From 1898 through 1918, six
87. Simon, supra note 6, at 255.
88. Dooley, supra note 5, at 354.
89. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law 12 Harv. L. Rev.
443-63 (1899), reprinted in THE HOLMES READER 85 (Julius J. Marke ed., 2d ed. 1964).
Accord JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 194-95 (1970) ("The jury makes the
orderly administration of justice virtually impossible.").
90. See, e.g., An Act of June 2, 1836, 1836 Conn. Pub. Acts 5, ch. 6.
91. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). The first African-American
jurors ever were probably the two jurors in a Massachusetts trial in 1860. Alschuler &
Deiss, supra note 7, at 884-85.
92. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 108.
93. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 592-97 (1935).
94. Martha Craig Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures after
Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1975); JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 53-58 (1977).
Not until the later twentieth century did African-Americans actually get any significant
access to the jury box in the South. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race
Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401,
1414, 1432-33 (1983).
95. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 362
(1768).
96. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 898.
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states passed legislation to include women in the jury pool.97 By the
1940s, a majority of states made women eligible to serve on juries,
although it took thirty years for the Court to ban jury selection
processes that had the effect of placing fewer women than men in the
jury pool.98
Despite these nieasures to increase the inclusiveness of the jury,
the jury was still not as diverse as it would later become, largely be-
cause the ultimate members of the jury pool were selected by public
officials not at random.99 Moreover, these officials could exclude peo-
ple from jury service on non-gender or race bases that would have the
effect of minimizing the inclusion of minorities on the jury, such as
excluding daily wage earners from jury seivice.1°° Yet, by any mea-
sure, the certainty of an all-white, all-male jury was a thing of the past.
Parallel to the increasing diversity of the jury pool, dramatic so-
cial events added to the diversity of voices between 1850 and 1950.
The Civil War, the women's suffrage movement, and the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments are among the most nota-
ble. During this same period, the business community began to expe-
rience the presence of other voices as well, as evidenced by the
enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Securities and Ex-
change Acts of 1933 and 1934.
Overtime, the homogeneity of voices began to erode, but was
more persistent than one might imagine. By 1900, whites were still
87% of the population.101 On the other hand, by 1860, the census was
divided not simply into "white" and "Negro," but also had a third cat-
egory of "Indians and Mongolian."102
By 1900, school enrollment of both white males and females was
at 53%, while nonwhite enrollment had risen to 31%.103 In 1950,
white enrollment was 79%, nonwhite was 75%. 104 In 1950, whites
completed a median of nine years of education, while nonwhites com-
pleted seven.105 In 1952, illiteracy rates for whites, roughly 2%, were
97. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 113.
98. Id.
99. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 879-80.
100. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1946).
101. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, A CENTURY
OF POPULATION GROWTH 1790-1900, at 80, 82 (1909).
102. Id.
103. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HisTomcA STATISTICS
OF THE UNrrED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 369-70 (1975).
104. IL
105. Id. at 381.
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approximately one-fifth of that for nonwhites.10 6 Yet this was a dra-
matic improvement over 1900, when the ratio was closer to one-sev-
enth, with the nonwhite rate at over 44%.107
In 1900, 90% of the males qualified to vote were white.'08 By
1950, virtually all men and women could vote, and so white males only
constituted roughly 44% of the eligible voting population. 0 9
(b) The Expressions of the Role and Scope of the Jury
Constituency theory postulates that an increase in the diversity of
either jurors or the voices in the community leads to an increased dis-
trust of the jury and that this distrust leads to pressure to restrict the
role and power of the jury. Thus, constituency theory would predict
that the increase in diversity of voices and jury pool during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century would correlate to a shift in
the perception of, and the power of, the jury. This shift is, in fact,
what occurred.
Originally, juries were populist bodies that served a wide range of
democratic functions in the judicial system. But the nineteenth cen-
tury reshaped the conversation about juries. Diverse parties sought
and received a right to a jury of their peers." 0 This reshaped the pub-
lic view of juries from populist entities serving political needs to insti-
tutions serving the needs of the litigants to receive accurate decisions
on the evidence, thereby protecting litigants from wayward, biased, or
incapable jurors.
The pressure for a "jury of one's peers," a phrase with early roots
in America,"' and the effect this had on the institution of the jury,
arguably was a product of the Civil War. 1 2 In colonial days when
106. Id. at 382.
107. Id.
108. UNITED STATES CENSUS OFFICE, ABSTRACT OF THE TWELFTH CENSUS 1900, at 18
(1902).
109. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, at 13 (1994) (multiplying percentage of males and percent-
age of whites).
110. The Magna Carta is perhaps the earliest reference to an entitlement to a judgment
by one's peers, but modern historians suggest this is a reference to the desire of barons to
be tried by "peers," i.e., persons no lower in rank than themselves. Deirdre Golash, Race,
Fairness, and Jury Selection, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 155, 163-64 & n.78 (1992). By the time of
Patrick Henry, he used the phrase to mean ones neighbors who know him and his charac-
ter. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 579 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
111. See ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 17-55 (detailing the historic pressure for local
juries).
112. Golash, supra note 110, at 164-65.
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John Peter Zenger embraced a jury of his peers, it was to protect him
against a tyrannous government.113 Following the Civil War, African-
American leaders began to argue that an entitlement to a "jury of
one's peers" mandated the inclusion of African-Americans on juries
to protect African-American litigants from other citizens.
114
But this argument had a theoretical hurdle to overcome. The
Fourteenth Amendment might not be available as a mechanism to
guarantee access of African-Americans to the jury box. Until Recon-
struction, jury rights were seen as political rights, much like the right
to vote. 1 5 Members of Congress debated whether the Fourteenth
Amendment could extend to jury rights if they were not individual
civil rights."16 To solve this problem, the Reconstructionists argued
that the jury right was one of the civil rights of the litigant, not one of
the political rights of the juror.'1 7 In 1880, the Court confirmed and
adopted this view of juries. 18
Ironically, this move in the conception of the jury-from an insti-
tution serving the political needs of the community to one serving the
individual civil rights of the litigants-also became the linchpin of an
argument to restrict the power and role of the jury. Although the
early Americans did not dwell much on the scope of the jury's respon-
sibilities, there was at least some difference of opinion on the mat-
ter."19 No one questioned, however, that juries were considered to be
superior to judges in deciding questions of fact.120 Indeed, some his-
113. LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN His-
TORY: Legacy of Suppression 131 (1960).
114. LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFrERMATH OF SLAV-
ERY 505 (1979). See also Hyman & Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE
JuRY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRmicAL OVERVIEW, supra note 73, at 36-38.
115. See Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin To Voting, supra note 5
(discussing the Supreme Court's dealings with the constitutional limits and discrimination
in the jury selection process).
116. See, eg., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844-45 (1872); see generally Aischuler
& Deiss, supra note 7 (describing the legislative debate over extending the civil rights of
African Americans to include serving on juries).
117. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 889-93 (outlining the Republican legisla-
tors' argument that discrimination in jury selection violates African Americans' civil
rights).
118. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1879).
119. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe' Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THm
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 67, at 282-83 (stating that "[juries] are not
qualified to judge questions of law; but they are very capable of judging questions of fact.")
120. See, e.g., Richard Henry Lee, Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the
System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention (1787), in 2 FEDERALIST AND
OTHER CONSTnI ONAL PAPERS at 867, 872 (Scott ed., 1894) (stating that it is better for
the jury to decide facts than a "well born" judge).
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torians assert that the provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act excluding
questions of fact determination from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction was a "victory" for those fearful of government attempts
to undermine the jury.121 But there is no indication this was a concern
over a litigant's civil rights; rather, the crux of the objection lay in the
political significance of the jury trial. Under a populist rationale, jury
fact finding was important because the community was entitled to jury
determinations as a way to maximize unbiased decision making.'22 As
a result of Reconstruction, the focus of juries had shifted to litigant
rights, and so the strongest argument for the jury to decide legal issues
had melted away.
The Court filled this new gap in legal theory, and thus the in-
creased diversity of the jury correlated to a restricted role for the jury.
In the first years of the nation's history, the Court considered the jury
entitled to "determine the law as well as the fact in controversy."'
123
One hundred years later, the Court expressed the opposite view by
holding that a jury must follow the instructions of the trial court on the
law. 124 The jury was transformed from the "bulwark against tyranny
and corruption" to an "efficient instrument of justice according to
law." 12 By the end of the nineteenth century, the use of special ver-
dicts and legal instructions largely restricted the jury to fact finding,
and even its ability to do that was somewhat distrusted.
26
Although race may explain and demonstrate the shift in thinking
about juries from manifestations of political rights to manifestations of
civil rights, race is not necessarily the only factor. One scholar asserts
that the shift is a response to economic pressure: whereas businesses
need stability and predictability, empowered juries are only predict-
able if the jury pool is homogeneous, and as society became less ho-
mogeneous, jury power was naturally curtailed. 2 7 Others suggest that
121. Hyman & Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM
IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 73, at 23, 32.
122. Letters from The Federal Farmer (XV), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 58, at 316, 319-20 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Abbe' Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 67,
at 282-83.
123. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
124. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 67 (1895).
125. William H. Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases, 35 YALE L.J.
296, 296 (1926).
126. See generally Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74
Yale L.J. 170 (1964).
127. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, supra note 80, at 8 (1975); see
also HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 28-29, 84-85, 141-43, 228; Kotler, supra note 5, 152-53;
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the decreased role of the jury in a given region corresponded to the
development of a mature, trained, and numerous judiciary.128
Whatever the catalyst, throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, growing segments of society came to distrust juries
and forced restrictions in the jury's power. 29 Public conversation be-
gan to reflect a concern that juries were not convicting enough crimi-
nal defendants. 130 Juries became the focus of a perception that justice
was faltering when verdicts were held up to a standard of common
sense, and this was initially ascribed to the inadequacies of the ju-
rors.1 3 ' By 1915, articles appeared characterizing the law as now too
"complex and complicated" to trust the jury without the guidance of
the judge as a "check" on the jury-an ironic reversal of the original
vision of the role of the jury as a check on the judge.
132
Pressure grew for special verdicts as the cure for the "great weak-
ness in our method of using the jury.' 33 Commentators began to de-
scribe unfettered juries as "coming more and more into disrepute as a
drag" on justice. 34 Indeed, special verdicts and jury instructions were
a moderate position. Throughout this period, calls were made for the
abolition of juries in whole or in part. 3
5
By the mid-twentieth century, juries were no longer empowered
to exercise their rights as law-makers, but rather were restricted to
answering fact questions in special verdicts. Many, if not most, states
began to hold it to be error in a civil case to advise a jury on the law or
legal consequences of its verdict.' 36 Likewise, commentators criticiz-
Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Eval-
uation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 DET. L. REv. 595, 610 (1985).
128. HANs & VnIMAR, supra note 11, at 38-40.
129. One writer summarizes the holding of Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S.
51, 101 (1895) as "The jury was ... no longer seen as a means of protection from the state's
abuse of power, but rather as a source of abuse." Kotler, supra note 5, 129.
130. James W. Garner, Why Juries Refuse to Convict, 1 J. CRIM. L., Criminology & Pol.
Sci. 633 (1910).
131. William L. Ransom, Why Business Men Should Serve on Juries, 14 TENN. L. Rv.
181 (1936).
132. Lucilius A. Emery, Government By Jury, 24 YALE L.J. 265, 269-71 (1915).
133. Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 255 (1920).
134. RJ. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J.
194, 221 (1932).
135. James L. McLemore, An Argument Against Jury Trial in Civil Cases, 20 VA. L.
REv. 708 (1934).
136. Thorton v. Franse, 135 Kan. 782, 787, 12 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1932); Mechanics' Bank
v. Barnes, 86 Mich. 632, 646, 49 N.W. 475, 478 (1891); McCourtie v. United States Steel
Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 517, 93 N.W.2d 552, 563 (1958); Morrison v. Lee, 13 N.D. 591, 598,
102 N.W. 223, 225 (1904); Smith v. Capital Fin. Co., 169 Ohio St. 11, 14, 157 N.E.2d 315,
317 (1959); Lamb v. Ulrich, 94 Okla. 240, 246, 221 P. 741, 746 (1923); Welsh v. Fleming, 42
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ing the use of general verdicts pointed to the latitude it gave juries to
exceed the fact-finding role.137
The period's pressure for elimination of the general verdict
culminated with the codification of the procedural vehicle of the spe-
cial verdict. In 1937, the federal courts adopted Rule 49 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 138 Every state has now codified the same or
a similar procedural mechanism.
39
Rule 49 was not universally hailed. Justices William Douglas and
Hugo Black described the rule as "another means utilized by courts to
weaken the constitutional power of juries and to vest judges with
S.D. 193, 197, 173 N.W. 836, 837 (1919); Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn.
534, 548-49, 354 S.W.2d 464, 471 (1962); Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 125
Tex. 154, 165, 81 S.W.2d 482, 487 (1935); Coats v. Town of Stanton, 90 Wis. 130, 135, 62
N.W. 619, 621 (1895).
137. FRANK, supra note 89, at 170-85. On the other hand, the jury was seen as the best
entity for deciding facts (a litigant-oriented view of the importance of the jury). As Wilder
wrote, "For downright common sense, unsophisticated by too much learning, and for the
sort of shrewdness which discerns the truth hidden in the bowels of the complicated dis-
pute, commend us to a jury of twelve plain men of affairs." Wilder, supra note 84, at 391.
The advantage of juries over judges as the better able to sort through the facts was seen as
a lesson from "the experience of ages and wisdom." Deford, supra note 83, 102-03. Per-
haps for these reasons, a prevalent theme in court opinions of the time was the jury as an
ideal mechanism for discerning facts. In its own way, this is, on its merits, a disquieting
theme, not merely because of the silent rejection of the populist notion of juries, but also
because it rejects the early vision of juries as law-finding bodies. In the eighteenth century,
several states permitted juries to decide all questions of fact and law, and federal civil juries
were instructed to decide fact and law. Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment:
Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 33, 44 (1990); THE FEDERALIST No.
83, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888). But the theme became
ingrained. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Van Devanter held that the aim of the
Seventh Amendment is to ensure that "issues of law are to be resolved by the court and
issues of fact are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions by the court."
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1934). The Court reaf-
firmed this vision of the role of juries in numerous opinions. The Court described juries as
the "constitutional tribunal provided for trying facts." Berry v. United States, 312 U.S.
450, 453 (1941); see also Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 523, 525 (1956) (stating
"the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact"); Walker v. New Mex-
ico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
The Court bolstered this view through holdings confirming the fact finding province of the
jury. See Berry v. United States, 312 U.S. 450, 453 (1941) (civil jury has exclusive power to
weigh evidence); Barney v. Schmeider, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 248, 253 (1870) (civil jury's prov-
ince to balance testimony); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41-42 (1849) (civil jury's
duty to assess credibility of witnesses).
138. "The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a
special written finding upon each issue of fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
139. Price Ainsworth & Mike C. Miller, Removing the Blindfold: General Verdicts and
Letting the Jury Know the Effects of Its Answers, 29 S. TEX. L. REv. 233, 254-61 (1987).
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more power to decide cases according to their own judgments. '140 As
this criticism of Rule 49 reflects, special verdicts, in effect, shifted
power from juries to judges. That shift was a fundamental rejection of
a populist role for juries. In other words, the debate over special ver-
dicts is a revisiting of the original notion of the role and function of
juries in a democracy. 141
Yet the special verdict was only one of the jury restrictions
emerging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. There
was a "vastly expanded" use of devices designed to submit cases to
judges while "avoiding" juries, a "spectacular rapidity" in the granting
of new trials because jury verdicts were against the evidence, and, as
discussed above, a "rapidly promoted" view to restrict the jury to fact
determinations. 142 For example, Rule 50, also adopted in 1937, al-
lowed judgments Non Obstante Verdicto.143 Summary judgments, spe-
cifically authorized by Rule 56, had already been an approved
encroachment on the jury for several years.144
Each of these reforms was a battle in the power struggle between
judge and jury. The cumulative effect of the reforms is unmistakable,
and as constituency theory would predict, the judge gained power
while the role and power of the jury declined.
(3) The Late Twentieth Century Jury
(a) The Constituencies of the Jury Pool and the Community
In the late twentieth century, both the diversity of the jury pool
and the diversity of voices in the community blossomed. Changes in
the jury pool were dramatic. As late as 1960, the federal courts con-
tinued to select so-called Blue Ribbon juries.1 45 Seven years later,
140. Amendments to Rules of Civ. Pro. for the U.S. Dist. Cts., 374 U.S. 861, 868
(1963).
141. See Kotler, supra note 5, 134 (describing the notion that the jury's role becomes
less defined as it moves away from factual determinations into the realm of policy
determinations).
142. HoRwrrz, supra note 18, at 142-43. The various procedures for controlling the
civil jury "emerged" in the early twentieth century in the sense that the procedures became
codified, uniform, and widely used; each procedure existed in some form or fashion some-
where in America in the eighteenth century. Henderson, supra note 56, at 299-320.
143. "If a verdict was returned, the court may... direct the entry of judgment as a
matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
144. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-320
(1902) (describing the purpose and validity of summary judgements); General Investment
Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 135 N.E. 216 (1923).
145. Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System,
26 F.R.D. 409, 421-22 (1960). As Langston Hughes wrote in his poem The Black Man
Speaks,
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sixty percent of federal courts still used this "key-man" system.' 46 But
in 1968, Congress legislated that the jury must be selected at random
from a fair cross-section of the community,147 and two years later, the
Court extended this same requirement to the state courts.148 In fed-
eral courts, juries are now selected from voter registration lists or ac-
tual voter lists and are by law representative of a cross-section of the
community. Further diversifying the jury pool was the Batson series
of cases. Under this line of cases, jurors could not be subject to per-
emptory strike on the basis of race by either party in either civil or
criminal trials.' 49 In 1994, the Court extended the cases to gender
strikes.150 In the future, it well may be that the Court cannot "articu-
late grounds for tolerating" strikes based on "generalizations about
the influence of religion, national origin, or occupation.'
5 1
These changes in the federal law paralleled some fairly dramatic
changes to the jury on the state level. For example, in 1967, New York
finally abolished its requirement of at least de minimis property hold-
ings to serve on a jury.152 The Pennsylvania requirement that jurors
be taxpayers became moot.153
Even with all these changes, the jury box is still not as heteroge-
neous as the community. For example, economic inability to serve
tends to mean the jury is made up of more people who are middle-
aged, middle-class, and working for large employers. 54 Automatic ex-
emptions tend to eliminate professionals. 155 Age discrimination may
I swear to the Lord
I still can't see
Why Democracy means
Everybody but me.
JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETIr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 1050 (14th ed.).
146. Charles A. Lindquist, An Analysis of Juror Selection Procedure in the United
States District Courts, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 44-45 (1967).
147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (1988).
148. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
149. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 499
(1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991).
150. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
151. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 137.
152. An Act to Amend the Judiciary Law, in Relation to Qualifications of Jurors § 1,
1967 N.Y. Laws 68, ch. 49.
153. Clark v. Ellenbogen, 319 F. Supp. 623, 628 (W.D. Pa. 1970), affid, 402 U.S. 935
(1971).
154. DIPERNA, supra note 11, at 87.
155. Id. at 86.
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still prevail as well.'5 6 But, all in all, the jury has become remarkably
more diverse.
The diversity of voices in the general American community also
blossomed in the late twentieth century. The last three decades have
brought the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the
gay rights movement. Other developments during this period include
the Civil Rights Acts, affirmative action, a Catholic President, calls for
an African-American, Colin Powell, to seek the Presidency, integra-
tion of the military, and a public debate over sexual preference orien-
tation. Further, women gained unprecedented public voice and
influence, albeit not equal to that of men.157
Changes in the American political scene is another indication of
the increased number of voices in American society. The most visible
exercise of voice in politics is the lobbyist. There are approximately
five times as many registered lobbyists today than in 1950.158 Esti-
mates are that less than 10% of the lobbyists register. 5 9 If these num-
bers are roughly accurate, then the approximate growth of lobbyists
over the last fifty years is from 15,000 in 1950 to 80,000 in 1990.
Diversity among politicians has also greatly increased in recent
decades. In 1992, approximately 17,500 women held state or local
public office.' 60 In 1990, approximately 4000 Hispanics and 7000 Afri-
can-Americans held public office.' 6' The 102d Congress (1991) had 30
women, twenty-five Africain-Americans, and eleven Hispanics. 162
The 1990 census reflects an increasingly diverse nation. The
white population decreased to 80.3%.163 Whites and nonwhites had
156. See Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, supra note 5,211-
17 (detailing age discrimination in jury selection).
157. Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Sub-
ordination of Groups, supra note 3, 127-47.
158. Compare CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES & SECRETARY OF THE
SENATE, REPORT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING Acr HL1-HL96
(Feb. 23,1995), HL185-HL210 (June 6,1995), with CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES & SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, REPORT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF
LOBBYING Act S1975-S1875 (Mar. 2, 1950).
159. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Overhaul of Lobbying Laws Unlikely to Succeed Thanks to
Opposition of Lobbyists Themselves, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1991, at A16.
160. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNrrED STATES: 1992, supra note 163, at 268.
161. Id. at 267-68.
162. Id. at 264.
163. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNIED STATES: 1992 (112th ed.), at 16-17 (1992). The Bureau of the Census projects
this figure will drop to 72% by 2050. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF TIE UNITED STATES 1994, supra note 109, at 13.
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nearly identical percentages of their populations enrolled in primary
and secondary schools. 164 Also nearly identical were median school
years completed. 165 Roughly six million women and seven million
men were enrolled in college. 66 Further, census data now has a vari-
ety of new categories for race, including Asian, Pacific Islanders,
Alaska Natives, and Hispanic.167 Also, by 1990, the Bureau of the
Census collected religious data, and the 1990 statistics show that only
56% of the country considers itself Protestant. 68
Adding to the diversity of the juror pool and voice in American
society is the fact that jurors are drawn from voting and drivers license
rolls.169 In 1992, 68.2% of the eligible population was registered to
vote.170 Of those eligible to vote in 1994, 20% were African-Ameri-
can or Hispanic.' 7' Almost all American adults have drivers
licenses-the resident population of the United States over age fifteen
in 1992 was 196,121,000,172 and the number of drivers licenses was
173,125,000.173 By any measure, the diversity of the jury pool and the
voices in the community is at a new zenith.
(b) The Expressions of the Role and Scope of the Jury
The constituency theory would predict that given the high level of
diversity now present among constituencies with voice and constituen-
cies in the jury pool, the current public conversation would have two
features. First, it should have scant discussion of the populist vision of
164. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1992, supra note 163, at 142.
165. Id. at 143.
166. Id.
167. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1994, supra note 109, at 13.
168. Id. at 70.
169. While drivers license and voting rolls provide the most diverse juries seen to date,
New York state has taken tis even one step further with its recent announcement that it
will require that its pool of prospective jurors include people drawn from both welfare and
unemployment rolls. Frances A. McMorres, New York State to Call Neediest for Jury Duty,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1994, at B1, Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, The
Jury Project 5-7 (1994). Arizona, in response to findings that juries still do not fairly ap-
proximate the racial and ethnic demographics of the community, is considering drawing
jurors from the telephone directory, utility hook-up lists, and vehicle registrations. The
Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of Juries, Jurors: The Power of
12, at 38-40 (1994) (on file with Federal Judicial Center).
170. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1994, supra note 109, at 286.
171. id. at 289.
172. Id. at 15.
173. Id. at 628.
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juries and, second, the public rhetoric about juries should be as di-
verse as the constituencies have become. That is exactly what is
OCCurring. 174
There is little dialogue regarding the populist visions of juries in
the twentieth century. Within the last several years, a handful of
thoughtful academics have reminded readers of the original concept
of juries.175 Likewise, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, broadly
recognized that civil juries legitimize the resolution of private disputes
in the eyes of the community.176 Beyond these mentions, however,
the populist vision of juries is largely relegated to dissenting opin-
ions177 or dicta.178 There are also some indirect court references along
the same lines. Various decisions refer to juries as the protector of
citizens from "arbitrary law, enforcement,"' 79 "the corrupt or over-
zealous prosecutor," and "the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.'U80
These isolated references largely constitute the totality of the cur-
rent public conversation endorsing populist theories 'of juries. The
concept of the jury as a revered populist institution is simply no longer
internalized as part of our system of justice.' 8 '
174. See generally Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape: As Congress struggles to
rewrite the nation's tort laws, the states already may have done the job, 81 A.B.A.J. 56 (Aug.
1995) (detailing three waves of tort reform in response to public pressure, beginning in the
1970's). As summarized by Professor Dooley in regard to civil cases, "the twentieth cen-
tury... produced an even more forthright encroachment on jury power .... ." Dooley,
supra note 5, at 333.
175. TWo provocative articles are indicative of this work. Professor Akhil Amar has
put forth the case that juries are an integral part of an overarching populist ideal of the
entire Bill of Rights, which seeks to involve citizens in all aspects of government. Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, supra note 5, 1182-99. Professor Vikram
Amar has extended this argument to an analysis of the constitutional consequences of
viewing jury rights as akin to voting rights. Vikram David Amar, Jury Service As Political
Participation Akin To Voting, supra note 5.
176. Sioux City & Pacific R.R. V. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 663-64 (1873). See also
In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litg., 631 F.2d 1069, 1093Y(3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) ("the [legitimizing] role of the jury is highly significant").
177. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,343-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,209 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218,236 (5th Cir. 1990). (Rubin, J., dissenting); Frank Irey,
Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200, 1208 (3rd Cir.
1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
178. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991); Standard Oil Co. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d
1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 1984).
179. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970).
180. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
181. Indeed, this is very much the point of Professor Vikram Amar's article. Vikram
David Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin To Voting, supra note 5.
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Meanwhile, the rest of the public conversation about juries re-
flects wider and wider extremes. On the one hand, public discontent
with the results of particular trials and with the jury in general has
increased.182 This is not just a sentiment of the lay public-jurists,
including then Chief Justice Burger, have expressed their readiness to
eliminate juries at least in civil trials.' 8
3
Courts seem in complete conflict over what to do with juries.
One of the most forthright presentations of the debate is the pair of
opinions of Judge Leventhal and Chief Judge Bazelon in United States
v. Dougherty.184 These jurists express conflicting views regarding
whether judges should inform jurors of their right to acquit without
regard to the law and the evidence.1 85 Some commentators have also
called for the strict restriction of juries to fact-finding. 18 6
Today, we seem to be moving into a third stage in the evolution
of debate about what juries are and why they are important. The cur-
rent vision is that all segments of the judicial system, including juries,
simultaneously should be representative of the views of all constituen-
cies in the community and should be delivering verdicts recognized as
accurate by the entire community, and if the jury cannot be adapted
to further this goal then perhaps it should be abolished altogether.
187
182. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 19 ("Many people argue that the jury,
although once a vital component of the criminal justice system, is no longer important.").
183. Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary, 57 A.B.A.J. 855, 858 (1971).
184. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
185. Id. at 1130-47. The majority opinion argues that "[n]o legal system could long
survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law which
by his personal standard was judged morally untenable." 473 F.2d at 1134, quoting U.S. v.
Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970). Chief Judge
Bazelon, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued "[n]o matter how horrible the
effect feared by the Court, the validity of its reasoning depends on the existence of a de-
monstrable connection between the alleged cause (a jury nullification instruction or argu-
ment to the jury on that issue) and that effect. I am unable to see a connection." Id. at
1141.
186. See Kotler, supra note 5.
187. The pressure to devalue or eliminate juries finds voice in a variety of ways. For
example, the ABA Journal recently addressed restricting juries as a major component of
potential tort reform. Public Discontent: The debate goes beyond tort law; it's about law-
yers, 81 A.B.A.J. 70, 72-73 (Aug. 1995). Likewise, this year the front page of the Boston
Globe ran an article questioning the entire desirability of juries. BosToN GLOBE, May 22,
1995, at 1; see also SYRACUSE HERALD AM., June 11, 1995, at A14 (presenting article with
subsection entitled "Jury system on trial"). An obvious catalyst of this focus is the trial of
O.J. Simpson, a jury trial that has made juries a topic of public ridicule. See, e.g., editorial
cartoon in USA TODAY, June 9, 1995, at 11A (reporting juror says "Burp. Excuse Me."
and Judge Ito responds "OK.") (The Globe article merely echoes sporadic but increasing
comments of legal commentators arguing that perhaps juries should be a concept of a by-
gone time because no jury at all might be better than one that reaches bad results. See
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The public reaction to the justice system supports this third vision
of juries. Today, when the public learns of a jury verdict in a familiar
trial, the immediate reaction is an evaluative one of whether the jury
did the right thing.188 V'rtually all members of the community seem
to believe that they know how the case should have been decided
even if their beliefs are not in harmony with the evidence as presented
or the burdens of proof. The public is not inclined to defer to the
jurors who saw and heard the evidence. Under this vision, the jury's
role is to make sure the "right result" has been obtained, without re-
gard to how hard the judge, litigants, witnesses, or attorneys have
tried to obscure that result.189
Another indication of the third view of the role of juries is the
decrease in deference that appellate courts now give to jury find-
ings.190 Before 1968, the Supreme Court aggressively enforced the
Seventh Amendment by zealously encouraging deference to jury find-
ings.19' Since then, appellate reversals of jury fact finding, once a rela-
tively rare event, have occurred in almost half of appeals of federal
civil jury trials when the appeals have raised a sufficiency of the evi-
dence point.192
Edward J. Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be Abolished, 60 A.B.A.J. 570 (1974)).
Similarly, consider a newspaper editorial where the writer points to a variety of lawsuit
filings the writer considers "outlandish," and concludes that the entire civil litigation sys-
tem must be reformed to be saved. See, eg., Joseph Perkins, Why the litigation explosion?
Let lawyers plead to this:, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRiB., June 30, 1995, at B-5. Upon close
inspection, this is an argument that the jury cannot be trusted to return a verdict that
reflects what the community "knows" to be justice, because the evidence of the specific
case may persuade the jury otherwise. The July/August 1995 issue of American Heritage
magazine has as its cover story an essay by Judge Hiller Zobel evaluating the desirability of
juries as an institution in contemporary America. Hiller B. Zobel, The Jury on Trial,
AMERICAN HERrrAGE 42 (July/Aug. 1995). A July edition of Newsweek has a column that
suggests any sort of dispassionate and accurate public explanation of the intersection of the
O.J. Simpson trial and "juries and .the Magna Carta and the 10 dismissed jurors and the
explanation of things that they are told to pretend they never heard" could be "terminal to
our legal system as we know it." Meg Greenfield, The Bob Newhart Test, NEWSWEEK 66
(July 17, 1995). Even that most down-to-earth of outlets of public opinion, Ann Landers,
endorses eliminating juries. Dear Ann Landers, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 21, 1995.
188. According to a recent essay in The Atlantic Monthly, the criminal justice system is
losing public confidence because it lacks the moral authority to convince the public that the
system comes to just results. Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, THE ATLAN-
nc MoNTHLY 72, 76 (Mar. 1995).
189. The then President of the American Trial Lawyers Association saw jury selection
not as a route to impartial decision-makers, but as a way to secure an advantage for a
client. Robert E. Cartwright, Jury Selection, 13 TRIAL 28, 28-31 (Dec. 1977).
190. Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries-Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury
Verdicts, 1989 Wisc. L. REv. 237, 238 (1989).
191. Id. at 238-46.
192. I& at 246-89.
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Yet even before this latest iteration of disillusionment with the
jury, there have been occasional calls for the restriction or elimination
of the jury. For example, in 1937, Justice Cardozo expressed the view
that there was nothing sacred about juries, and their abolition would
do no great harm to America.193 In 1963, Dean Griswold explicitly
recommended that if the goal was administration of justice, civil juries
should be abolished. 194 The English scholar Glanville Williams said it
was somewhat of an understatement to describe a jury as "twelve peo-
ple of average ignorance."' 95 Others have expressed similar senti-
ments throughout the twentieth century.1 96 But today, the public
expressions of dissatisfaction with the entire institution seem more
frequent and more strident.
Within the scholarship, the pressure on the jury remains un-
abated. Many articles have focused on further potential jury re-
form. 197 A large body of scholarship developed in studying how the
jury makes decisions, with the underlying implication being that the
jury's rationale of the jury was not easily apparent.198 Finally, some
scholars continue to argue for the elimination of the institution en-
tirely. Consider this brief sampling: A 1965 article calls for the aboli-
tion of the state right to jury trial,199 similar calls are found in the
193. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
194. 1962-1963 Harvard Law School Dean's Report 5-6; accord Leon Sappy, Civil Ju-
ries, Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11 Loy. L. REV. 243 (1962-63) (calling for elimination
of the civil jury).
195. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILr A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMI-
NAL TRIAL 271 (3rd ed.) (1963).
196. HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5-7 (1971).
197. See, e.g., Max Hara, The Streamlined Jury System, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 89 (1962)
(arguing for changes in voir dire and instructions in order to save jury trials); Lloyd L.
Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZ. L. REV. 35 (1968) (arguing for a reduction in the
number of jurors); Brent J. Gurney, The Case For Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in
Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986).
198. See, e.g., Gerald R. Miller, David C. Bender, Frank Boster, B. Thomas Florence,
Norman Fontes, John Hocking, & Henry Nicholson, The Effects of Videotape Testimony in
Jury Trials: Studies on Juror Decision Making, Information Retention, and Emotional
Arousal, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 331 (1975) (concluding that videotape testimony has no dis-
cerning effects on jurors); Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences:
Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1975) (contemplating
the effects of a reduction in jury size); Alvin K. Klevorick & Michael Rothschild, A Model
of the Jury Decision Process, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 141 (1979) (creating a mathematical model
to predict jury decisions); Jacquelin Goldman, Kenneth F. Freundlich, & Victoria A. Casey,
Jury emotional response and deliberation style, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 319 (1983) (con-
ducting a mock trial and observing the response and deliberation of jury).
199. Delmar Karlen, Can a State Abolish the Civil Jury?, 1965 Wisc. L. REv. 103
(1965).
1356 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
1970's, 200 and yet again in the 1980's. 201 Since 1950, any random sam-
ple of legal periodicals can find dozens of similar articles.
Today, more than at any other time, the rules governing trials
carry the same strident attitude toward juries. The rules permitting
summary judgments are widening.202 The movement towards smaller
juries has increased.20 3 The Court has approved of non-unanimous
verdicts in state criminal trials. 2o4 The power of the jury to award cer-
tain types or levels of damages has been strictly curtailed.205 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence allow the judge to exclude even admittedly
relevant evidence if it is likely, in the judge's opinion, that the jury will
not deal with that evidence appropriately.206 Chief Justice Rehnquist
expresses near resignation to the eventual total erosion of the jury.20 7
One of the most intriguing bits of evidence about the marginal-
ization of the institution of the jury is how the power of jury nullifica-
tion, once a common feature of American discussion of jury
practice,208 has moved to the fringe of the conversation. John Adams
asserted that it was a juror's duty to ignore the directions of the court
when called upon by the juror's "best Understanding, Judgment, and
200. See e.g., Herbert Harley, Where Jury Trial Fails, 55 JuDicATrU 94 (1971) (stating
some flaws in the jury system); Robert M. Brady, Note, The Jury: Is It Viable?, 6 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 897 (1972) (arguing for vast improvements in the jury system).
201. Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 Loy. L. REv. 205 (1985); John
Feikens, The Civil Jury-An Endangered Species, 20 U. MICH. J. OF L. REF. 789 (1987).
202. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986) (summary judgment
does not require a showing of undisputed facts on each element, but rather can be met by a
showing of opponents failure to establish facts).
203. The nationwide shift to six person civil juries is summarized in Hans
Zeisel.... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.CHI. L.
REv. 710, 710 (1971). The Court approved of six person criminal juries in 1970. Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). The parallel ruling for civil juries is Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973).
204. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,359 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
410-11 (1972).
205. Seventeen states have raised the standard of proof for recovery of punitive dam-
ages, twelve have capped punitive damages, four prevent punitive damages entirely, seven-
teen have capped non-economic damages, and all but nineteen states have passed
measures to restrict product liability recovery. Middleton, supra note 174, at 59.
206. FED. R. Evn,. 403; accord CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE UNDER THE RtnS 1 (1993) ("mistrust of juries is the single overriding reason
for the law of evidence").
207. Parklane Hosiery Co. V. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
208. See, eg., LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TR AL. By JURY (1971) (an
unabridged republication of the first edition published in Boston in 1852); see generally
DiPERNA, supra note 11 ("Most Colonial American juries retained the right to decide both
law and fact in civil and criminal cases.").
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Conscience .... -209 Dean Wigmore believed the quintessential role
of the jury was to supply "the flexibility of legal rules which is essen-
tial to justice and popular contentment. '210 Dean McCormick
agreed.211
Yet, now the mention of nullification power increasingly has
moved to less influential forums. The National Law Journal recently
published an article chronicling a series of "jury revolts," primarily in
California, and casually asserting that such events were certainly
within the jury's power.212 A similar article appeared a few months
earlier in the Los Angeles Daily Journal.21 3 A Montana-based group
styled The Fully Informed Jury Association seeks to codify the jury's
right to nullify.214 One prominent federal judge recently wrote the
single sentence in an article, "When juries refuse to convict on the
basis of what they think are unjust laws, they are performing their
duty as jurors. '215 These articles are indicative of where and how the
discussion of nullification now occurs. The "conventional wisdom" is
that the power of juries to decide the law, or to nullify, is a concept
that no longer squares with the modem sense of law.216
The jury, simply put, is moving to the edges of the spectrum of
respectability. As one judge summarized the state of the jury, "in the
mad rush of events that afflicts the legal profession as well as the rest
of society in the late twentieth century, we have managed to weaken
trial by jury and even to threaten its future. '21 7
209. 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 5 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 1961).
210. John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 AM. JuD. Soc. 166,
170 (1929).
211. Charles T. McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2
F.R.D. 176, 177 (1941).
212. Gail Diane Cox, Feeling the Pressure: Jurors Rise Up Over Principle and Their
Perks, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 29, 1995, at 1, 22.
213. Franklin Strier, Jurors as Outlaws: Permitting Juries to Disregard the Law Leads to
Chaos, Los ANGELES DAILY J., Dec. 6, 1994, at 6.
214. Katherine Bishop, Diverse Group Wants Juries to Follow Natural Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at B16; Dick Dahl, Group Aims for "Conscientious" Juries, MASS
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Mar. 4, 1991, at 35.
215. Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should a Jury
Reject the Law To Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 239, 240 (1993).
216. Morris S. Arnold, The Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, in THE AMERICAN
CIVIL JURY 9, 13 (1986).
217. William L. Dwyer, Protecting the Right of Trial By Jury: It Requires, and Is Worth,
Vigilance, 25 TRIAL 77, 77 (June 1989).
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(4) A Recap of the Historical Record and Constituency Theory
The historical record reflects a correlation between the level of
diversity of voices and jurors on the one hand, and the trust, power,
and role of the jury on the other. The eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries were the heyday of the populist theory of juries. At that
time, juries were glorified as a method of securing citizen participation
and oversight in the judicial branch of government. Thus, a jury had
the power to not only know the legal consequences of its verdict, but
to decide the law. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury, jury rights were not seen as political rights of jurors but as civil
rights of litigants. Thus, a jury was confined to deciding issues of fact,
often through special verdicts, and might not be told the legal conse-
quences of the factual findings. Now, the public conversation is in-
creasingly expressing concern over the jury's ability and right to be
part of the process at all. Throughout this evolution of the role and
perception of the jury, the correlation predicted by constituency the-
ory appears. In sum, the historical record suggests that constituency
theory is a plausible explanation of the evolving perception and power
of the American jury.
H. Incompetency as a Cause of the Contemporary Distrust
of Juries
A. The Theory: Juries Are Asked To Do More Than They Are Capable
of Doing
The constituency theory of juries largely departs from the way
scholars have generally thought and written about juries over the last
several decades. The traditional view has postulated a growing gap
between the increasing complexity of the law and the static capabili-
ties of the jury, suggesting that much of what now goes on in courts is
beyond the reach and ability of the jury.218 Indeed, the sources cited
in the preceding review of the history of debate about juries in
218. See, e.g., Lucilius A. Emery, Government By Jury, supra note 132, at 269-71 (char-
acterizing the law in 1915 as "now" too "complex and complicated" to trust the jury with-
out the guidance of the judge as a "check" on the jury); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON
TRLAL: MYTH AND REALrrY IN AMERICAN Jusncn 116-20 (1950) (arguing that in 1949,
without special training the law is beyond the reach of jurors); REID HAsTm, ET AL., IN-
smn T=K JURY 1 (1983) (arguing that in 1983, "foin the civil side, advances in science and
engineering have created complexities in disputes that challenge the experts in the field
and would seem to require an unattainable level of sophistication on the part of jury mem-
bers."); Brodin, supra note 5, at 19 (asserting that "many of the concerns that have been
raised over the years about the civil jury are a function not so much of the institution itself
but rather of the manner in which we have utilized it"); but see Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme.
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America reflect dozens of calls for jury reform on the basis that the
law is just too complicated for lay jurors, and thus the courts ask too
much of them.
This underlying concern that we ask too much of jurors is seen
throughout the arguments for suggested jury reforms. Perhaps the
most widely discussed reform is the special verdict. An excellent re-
view of the calls for special verdicts is that of Professor Mark Brodin,
who advocates restricting the jury's scope of decision-making to
purely non-legal decisions.2 19 As Professor Brodin summarizes, the
traditional arguments for special verdicts are that restricting the deci-
sion-making functions of the jury would "improve the deliberation
process by packaging the dispute in distinct, manageable compo-
nents," "concentrat[e] juror attention on certain matters," "aid the ju-
rors in sorting out the facts and avoiding confusion," "ensure a truly
unanimous decision," "facilitate the appellate process by spelling out
the premises underlying the jury's ultimate conclusions," and "[be] ex-
tremely helpful in the application of collateral estoppel (issue preclu-
sion)."220 Another writer, a United States District Court judge, in the
course of arguing for special verdicts noted that "jury verdicts often
represent compromises, and it is not easy to reach separate compro-
mise agreements on several fact-findings of a special verdict."2 21
These arguments all imply that the jury is either not to be trusted or is
overtaxed by being asked to do more than decide the facts.222
Professor Wigmore suggests that judges should comment on the
evidence2 3 and thus make the jury share fact-finding responsibility
with the judge. The judge should be allowed to assume this role, Wig-
Court 1978 Term-Forewardr The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 29 (1979) (arguing
that "courts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes").
219. Brodin, supra note 5. Before Professor Brodin's article, there was largely unanim-
ity that while juries should be restricted to fact-findings, juries should receive instructions
on the law. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7. at 913. Ironically, this was not the case in
England at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, in the instance where the trial
involved a special verdict. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 377-78 (1st ed. 1765-69) (stating that the jury could use a special verdict to "state
the naked facts, as they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the court thereon").
220. Brodin, supra note 5, at 58, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71 (1990).
221. Samuel M. Driver, The Special Verdict-Theory and Practice, 26 WASH. L. Rav.
21, 24 (1951) (suggesting that special verdicts, as opposed to general verdicts, would unduly
lengthen trials by extending the amount of time juries would deliberate).
222. Dean Leon Green asserted that "blindfolding" the jury as to the legal conse-
quences of its verdict reflected a distrust of the entire institution of the jury. Leon Green,
Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEx. L. REv. 273, 284 (1955).
223. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 664-
69 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed., 1981).
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more writes, because the exclusive grant of fact-finding to juries, and
the resulting prohibition of judges commenting on the evidence, "has
done more than any other one thing to impair the general efficiency of
the jury trial as an instrument of justice." 4 Again, this reflects a ba-
sic assumption that the jury is either untrustworthy or incompetent.
Some commentators have suggested reducing the size of the jury
as a means of reform. -" In 1982, twelve states allowed civil juries
smaller than twelve.2 6 Usually the proffered rationale is that reduced
size will save time and money without impairing accuracy.2 7 In many
cases, the commentators seem to suggest they are using euphemistic
language for shifting power from the unsatisfactory jury to the more
dependable judge.228 Some writers are less euphemistic about their
motivations. They say that the six-person jury is the best, that can be
achieved in lieu of the preferable reform of eliminating juries
entirely. 229
Today, another popular jury reform is to limit or eliminate per-
emptory strikes.230 A typical rationale for this reform is, "that the
only way to eradicate the racial prejudice that peremptory challenges
inject into the jury selection process is to eliminate them entirely. ' 231
224. Id. at 666.
225. See, e.g., Edward A. Tamm, A Proposal for Five-Member Civil Juries in the Federal
Courts, 50 A.B.A. J. 162 (1964); Lloyd L. Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, supra note 197 (1968);
Anthony T. Augelli, Six-Member Juries in Civil Actions in the Federal Judicial System, 3
SEToN HALL L. RFv. 281 (1972); J. Edward Lumbard, Let the Jury Be-But Modified,
TRIAL, 17, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 17.
226. Hans Zeisel, The Verdict of Five Out of Six Civil Jurors: Constitutional Problems,
1982 AM. B. FOUND Rns. J. 141, 155 (1982).
227. See, e g., Edward A. Tamm, A Proposal for Five-Member Civil Juries in the Federal
Courts, supra note 225, at 164-66; Lloyd L. Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, supra note 197, 39-40
(1968).
228. See Peter W. Sperlich.... And then there were six: the decline of the American
jury, 63 JuDicAruRE 262, 277-78 (1980).
229. Anthony T. Augelli, Six-Mem ber Juries in Civil Actions in the Federal Judicial Sys-
tem, supra note 225, 289-91 (1972); J. Edward Lumbard, Let the Jury Be-But Modified,
TRIAL Nov.-Dec. 1971, supra note 225, at 17.
230. See; eg., Marder, supra note 5; Felice Banker, Note, Eliminating a Safe Haven For
Discrimination: Why New York Must Ban Peremptory Challenges From Jury Selection, 3
J.L. & PoL'Y 605 (1995); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: -Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 153, 163-211
(1989); but see Barbara L. Horwitz, The Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will
the Jury System Lose By Its Demisel 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. supra note 230, at 1391 (arguing
that equal protection concerns for defendants and potential jurors do not outweigh the
value of peremptory strikes to the litigants).
231. Felice Banker, Note, Eliminating a Safe Haven For Discrimination: Why New
York Must Ban Peremptory Challenges From Jury Selection, supra note 230, at 605 (para-
phrasing Thurgood Marshall in Batson v. Kentucky).
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The concern is that peremptory strikes give the lawyers procedural
camouflage to eliminate jurors based on race or other categoriza-
tions-a strategy that rests on the assumption that members of each
race will have certain uniform biases.2 32 The strikes are used to elimi-
nate disfavored biases and leave a jury of favored biases. In other
words, the lawyers can use peremptory strikes as an easy method to
get a jury that can be trusted to not be fair (i.e. not be competent as
unbiased jurors).
A related reform is the elimination of lawyer-conducted voir
dire.233 The argument in support of this reform is that through voir
dire attorneys are merely trying to either pick a biased jury or create a
bias in the jury.23 4 Implicit in this argument is the assumption that
attorneys can easily mold juries.
Another recently popular reform is the elimination of the re-
quirement of unanimous verdicts. By 1982, a majority of states had
already implemented this reform for civil juries.235 This reform may
be less obviously connected to a dissatisfaction with juries. Yet, ac-
cording to empirical work on the subject, there is "a relationship be-
tween support for majority verdicts and overall favorability to the jury
system, such that those judges who were most in favor of a change to
majority verdicts had relatively less favorable views of the jury. '236
Finally, a reform receiving much attention in recent years in-
volves various proposals to limit or cap the jury's power to award
damages of a particular type or in excess of a certain amount.237 As
232. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (describing instruction book used by
the Dallas prosecutor's office).
233. See generally Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An
Empirical Investigation of Juror Conduct, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 131, 132 (1987) ("The
current practice in most federal courts, and in an increasing number of state courts, is one
in which the judge conducts the questioning of potential jurors."); Arthur J. Stanley Jr.,
Who Should Conduct Voir Dire: The Judge, 61 JUDICATURE 70 (1977) (reporting on pro-
posed amendment to Rule 47(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow lawyers to
conduct voir dire); Mark A. Costantino, Abolish Lawyers' Voir Dire of Juries, LITIGATION
Spring 5 1982 at 8.
234. Mark A. Costantino, Abolish Lawyers' Voir Dire of Juries, supra note 233, at 5-6
(Spr. 1982); accord Arthur J. Stanley, Who Should Conduct Voir Dire?: The Judge, supra
note 233, at 72-75.
235. Hans Zeisel, The Verdict of Five out of Six Civil Jurors: Constitutional Problems,
supra note 226, at 155 (1982).
236. Valerie P. Hans, Evaluating the Jury: The Uses of Research in Policy Formation, in
EVALUATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 143, 155 (Ronald Roesch & Raymond R.
Corrado eds., 1981).
237. The pressure for damage caps, and the scholarship addressing it, is well summa-
rized in George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.
J. 1521, 1587-90 (1987).
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with the other suggested reforms, this reform is rooted, at least in part,
in "a basic distrust of the jury system. ' '238
B. The Disproof: Empirical Evidence That Judges Are No Better Than
Juries
Empirical evidence can be helpful in testing the traditional think-
ing. The underlying assumption of the traditional theory is that judges
would be more trustworthy and better decision-makers than juries. In
testing this assumption then, the question is not whether judges and
juries would decide some cases differently, but whether the jury is do-
ing a good job at getting the answer right.239 A growing body of em-
pirical evidence now addresses that question.2 40 It suggests that juries
are efficient and accurate, serve justice well, follow the law, and are
adept triers of fact. 241 As one study noted, "[w]hile trial by jury is not
238. Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of
Caps On Damages And Limitations On Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REv.
628, 631 (1988) (asserting that criticism of the jury's role in determining liability and dam-
ages in tort cases were underlying factors in tort reform legislation); see also Coleman A.
Young, Tort Judgments Against Cities: The Sky's the Limit, 1983 DET. C.L. REv. 1509, 1509
(asserting "Modem juries seem to have the impression that municipalities have access to a
bottomless pot of gold from which to pay verdicts of millions of dollars rendered in ques-
tionable, and even fraudulent, cases."); cf. Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive
Damage Caps and the Profit Motiv. An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 303
(1991) (summarizing the public outcry for caps on "skyrocketing" punitive damage
awards).
239. A summary of the reasons that Kalven and Zeisel found accounted for judge/jury
disagreement are found at HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY,
supra note 196, at 104-17 (1966). As the authors point out, however, the evaluation of the
jury's performance does not ultimately address the desirability of juries; rather, "[w]hether
the jury is a desirable institution depends in no small measure on what we think about the
judge.... Until an equally full and candid story of the judge is available, we have only half
the knowledge needed." Id. at 499.
240. Some of that research will now be summarized. Empirical research on juries can,
however, have severe limitations, especially when researchers try to "reverse engineer"
what kind of jurors will reach what kind of answers to what kind of questions and so should
be read carefully and closely. Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from
Jury Verdict Statistics: Cautions About the Lorelei's Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599
(1994).
241. This research is summarized and listed in Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehen-
sion of Difficult Issues: Lessons From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727, 744-50
(1991). See, e.g., REID HAsErm, Er AL., INSIDE THE JURY, supra note 218, at 230 ("conclud-
ing that [i]n their task of factfindirg, juries perform efficiently and accurately"); but see
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 89, at 192-93 (juries are notoriously
gullible and impressionable); accord Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 63
(2d Cir. 1948), cert denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957) (juries, more than judges, are subject to the
"seductive wiles of lawyers").
Judge Jerome Frank is the most prominent advocate of the contrary position-that the
jury is not a competent decision-maker. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
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perfect, calls for abolition of the jury seem draconian in light of the
fact that it displays competence and fair mindedness in the over-
whelming majority of criminal and civil cases. ' 242 Thus, the underly-
ing assumption of the traditional approach to jury reform perhaps
deserves more scrutiny. What does a closer look at the evidence
reveal?
(1) Answering Fact Questions
An underlying assumption of most analysis of juries is that fact-
finding, at a minimum, is the proper province of the jury.
2 43 This
premise no longer receives serious questioning even in the most
thoughtful reviews of jury theory, except in the debate over whether
there should be a "complexity" exception to the right to a civil jury.
244
The arguments are familiar: better to have twelve people decide mat-
ters of common wisdom than just one,2 45 the jury is less likely than the
judge to be jaded and having the factual predicates to liability or guilt
decided by the jury reduces the possibility of governmental abuse of
the judicial process.
246
Indeed, it is ironic that today restricting juries to fact-finding is
seen as a means of confining the power of juries. During the nine-
teenth century, American theorists actively debated whether fact-find-
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 108-45 (1950). Judge Frank recognized
the view of the jury as the great achievement of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, but he dis-
agreed. Id. at 108. He saw juries as irrational, uneducated, unpredictable, and over-
matched by the complexity of modern law and problems. Id. at 108-23. Judge Frank
looked back at the scholarship of the preceding years and saw increasing support for views
similar to his. Id. at 124-25. Thus he endorsed wide-ranging reforms restricting the jury's
power, including special verdicts, recording of deliberations, specially qualified jurors, and
juror training. Id. at 140-45.
242. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 246.
243. Even the pressure for gender and race diversity of the jury can be explained as a
means of promoting more accurate fact-finding. Golash, supra note 110, at 170.
244. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 2, at 734-35 (conceding that the jury is more capable
than the judge of making a rational decision about the facts because it brings the common
sense, experience, and training of several people).
245. For a concise, interesting essay discussing, among other issues, why it might be
better to have twelve citizens rather than one judge interpreting the evidence, see Ronald
J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the Theory of the Right To Trial By Jury, 66 WASH. U. L.Q.
33, 36-41 (1988).
246. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 2, at 734-35. One federal judge rejects the sugges-
tion that judges have the inability to render impartial justice, but opines that juries can
match this by being selected for their similarity to tabula rasa. United States v. Parker, 19
F. Supp. 450, 458 (D.N.J. 1937), affd., 103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 307 U.S.
642 (1939).
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ing was the exclusive province of the jury.247 In England, both then
and now, judges have been permitted to comment on the evidence to
the jury and have often done so in strong, pejorative terms.24s But in
America, the eighteenth century brought an ultimately successful
movement to deprive judges of this power.249 Thus, the original dis-
cussion of the jury as fact-finder was meant as a means of expanding
jury power and confining judicial power, not vice versa.250
Evidence from non-legal disciplines provides interesting insights
into the skills of juries versus judges at deciding fact questions, and by
extension, the skills of juries versus judges at making any type of deci-
sion. Psychologists conclude that the means juries use to decide fact
questions leaves "a good deal of room for improvement."'251 Yet, em-
pirical evidence shows that even in complex civil trials, juries are bet-'
ter fact-finders than judges.252 In one of his studies, Michael Saks
found that even in complex cases, the jury is likely as competent, and
perhaps better, at fact-finding than the judge, regardless of the talent
of the jurist.253 Contrary to popular folklore, a study of several hun-
dred jurors in actual cases reveals that jurors do not decide matters
based on opening statements, but reach a decision over the entire
length of the trial, heavily influenced by evidentiary issues and delib-
247. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Evalua-
tion of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, supra note 127.
248. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 184-85
(1898); PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 118 (rev. ed. 1966); Regina v. Hepworth, 4 Crim.
App. 128, 129 (1910).
249. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Evalua-
tion of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, supra note 127.
250. Id at 609-21.
251. See, e.g., SAUL M. KAsSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY
ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECrIVES 211 (1988).
252. Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power: The
Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 178-79 (1991) ("The com-
bined opinions of the varied members of the jury would be more likely to gauge the evi-
dence adequately than would a single decision maker, no matter how talented."); accord
JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 210-13.
253. Michael J. Saks, Small-Group Decision Making and Complex Information Tasks
26-33 (Feb. 1981) (Federal Judicial Centr. 1981); JoHN GULINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA,
supra note 56, at 210-13. Accord MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDIcrs: THE ROLE OF
GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION RULE 105-08 (1977) (asserting that the larger the
group, the more consistent the verdict).
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eration.254 This finding is particularly pertinent because a bench trial
does not afford the decision-maker with a deliberation process. 255
The central implication of the research is clear, and pertains to
virtually any type of decision-making by judges and juries: juries, by
almost any measure, out-perform judges. One reason may be that, as
the study by Professors Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington found, the
jurors' collective memory of evidence is impressive2 56 and demonstra-
bly better than individual memory.2 57 Moreover, large groups in-
crease the likelihood that, as to any task, at least one member will
have pertinent expertise.258 Also, juries out-perform judges in seeing
past prejudice and stereotype. 259 When confronted with complex
tasks "containing conclusions that were consistent with the presump-
tions and prejudice of most people.., groups [are] correct more often
than individuals" and even do better collectively than the group's
most capable member.260 Thus, it is not surprising that while jury ver-
dicts can be quite divergent, when judges are the decision-makers, the
result may be an increase in variability.2 61
254. Bettyruth Walter, When do Jurors Make up their Minds?, Paper Presented at the
Law and Society Meeting (June 1987) (on file with author); accord Bettyruth Walter, in
John Guinther, The Jury in America, supra note 56, at 342 (finding that during delibera-
tions, 22% of the jurors changed their opinions); see also Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S.
Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of
Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209 (1988) (asserting
that jurors tend to decide cases on legally relevant grounds and decided one way or the
other because they were persuaded by the evidence).
255. In an essay on the jury, Judge Charles Joiner characterized deliberation as "the
principal value of the jury," and was what made the jury a better fact-finder than he was.
Charles W. Joiner, From the Bench in The Jury System in America: A Critical Overview
143, 146, 146-48 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975). Indeed, even the popular press recognized that
perhaps the greatest concern in the wake of the O.J. Simpson verdict was that the jury did
not deliberate. Theo Wilson, Perspectives on the Simpson Verdicts, Is There Any Hope Left
for Justice With Jury Trials, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at B9.
256. REID HASTIE, ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY, supra note 218, at 80-81 (1983); Robert T.
Roper, Jury Size: Impact on Verdict's Correctness, 7 AM. POL. Q. 438, 447-51 (1979).
257. Michael J. Saks, Small-Group Decision Making and Complex Information Tasks,
supra note 253, at 29-30 (Federal Judicial Cntr. 1981).
258. Id. at 26-28.
259. See id. at 31-32; accord Carol M. Werner et al., The Impact of Case Characteristics
and Prior Jury Experience on Jury Verdicts, 15 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 409, 423 (1985) ("It
may be appropriate to use larger juries for all cases in which there is concern about individ-
ual biases.").
260. Michael J. Saks, Small-Group Decision Making and Complex Information Tasks,
supra note 253, at 31-32 (Federal Judicial Cntr. 1981).
261. Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plain-
tiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, supra
note 254, at 227.
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These studies suggest an affirmation of conventional wisdom. Ju-
ries are not perfect fact-finders. Juries are, however, as good, and per-
haps better, than judges at answering fact questions. 262 As one judge
recently wrote:
Does this mean that we should eliminate the jury's role as primary
fact finder in our system of justice? The answer, I suppose, depends
on what might replace jurors in administering justice. Short of some
chance-activated machine, a juryless society would have to depend
on one-person arbiters-that is, judges. Speaking from experience
and from numerous conversations with siblings of the robe, state
and federal, from all across the country, I have some doubt that the
tradeoff would be advantageous, and I am certain that the judges
themselves would not recommend it. Whatever may be the flaws in
trial by jury, and however ill adapted it may be for resolving drawn-
out, technical matters, most judges consider a multi headed deter-
mining body superior to a lone referee. Perhaps the jury, to para-
phrase what Churchill once said of democracy, is the worst
mechanism for trying cases except for any alternative.263
(2) Answering Questions of Law
Whether juries are as capable as judges at deciding pure ques-
tions of law is less clear. A broad reading of the empirical work on
jury fact-finding skills would suggest that juries might also out-per-
form judges at deciding any question, even questions of law. If juries
do a comparatively good job of answering factual questions, then why
do we, at least by and large, no longer give juries the power to decide
the law?264 Stated another way, why is it too much to expect of citi-
zens to give direction to the development of the common law?265
If the common law is merely the evolution of societal values to
address contemporary problems, then what makes a judge more quali-
fied, or "proper," than a jury to hear a history of past solutions and
decide how those solutions should or should not be applied to current
dilemmas? As John Adams wrote in his diary:
The general Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society,
under which ordinary Transactions arrange themselves, are well
262. See HANS & ViDmAR, supra note 11, at 247 ("Even if one argues that the average
judge is smarter in discerning legal facts that [sic] the average juror, is the judge as smart as
twelve jurors?").
263. Hiller B. Zobel, The Jury on Trial, AM. H RiTAGE 42, 51 (July-Aug. 1995).
264. But see Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy-Making: The Role of the
Jury, 39 J. POL 73, 74-76 (1977) (arguing that juries still do make policy).
265. See Hyman & Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE JURY Sys-
TEM IN AMERICA: A CRrcAL OvERVIEW, supra note 73, at 35 (asserting that in eight-
eenth century America, "ordinary men considered themselves as qualified as lawyers to
argue about (that is, to politicize) technical legal matters").
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enough known to ordinary Jurors. The great Principles of the Con-
stitution, are intimately known, they are sensibly felt by every
Briton-it is scarcely extravagant to say, they are drawn in and im-
bibed with the Nurses Milk and first Air.
2 6 6
As this quote suggests, the modern view that juries should not decide
the law was not the position of the Founders. The Supreme Court
originally explicitly charged the jury with the responsibility "to deter-
mine the law. '2 67 Yet the Court held in the Sparf and Hansen decision
one hundred years later that a jury must follow a judge's instructions
on the law.2 68 Sparf and Hansen is still the law today. Is this really a
matter of qualifications, or is it rather the very kind of imperious atti-
tude of governors to the governed that the institution of the jury was
designed to prevent? 2
69
There exists occasional anecdotal evidence on the jury's compe-
tence to decide the law. For example, in San Diego, a judge is under
fire from the City Attorney's office (indeed, the city attorneys refuse
to appear before him) because, among other reasons, allegedly "[h]is
rulings and some of his actions just don't seem to comport with the
laws that are in front of him," and he "lacks legal knowledge. T270 The
judge defends himself by asserting that "survey responses from nu-
merous jurors who served in his courtroom.., repeatedly described
[the judge] as knowledgeable. " 271 At least in this instance, there is
anecdotal support for the conclusions that the judge was not skeptical
of the jury's ability to evaluate legal matters, there appears to be mini-
mal judge/jury disparity, and the attorneys' dissatisfaction is, at root,
apparently result, not content, oriented.
Yet there is some empirical research that refutes these anecdotal
conclusions. One study which primarily looked at how juries handled
jury instructions concluded that juries have major problems under-
standing and applying the law and, given the opportunity, make fre-
quent errors on legal questions.2 72 In the comprehensive study of jury
266. Adams' Diary Notes on the Right of Juries, (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
267. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794); accord Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 305 (1825).
268. 156 U.S. 51. For a solid and more detailed analysis of Sparf and Hansen, see
ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 85-88. Professor Abramson notes that the civil jury lost its
law making power much earlier. Id. at 75.
269. As Professors Hans and Vidmar remind us, "We must also consider the fact that
trials are about justice as well as law." HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 247.
270. Anne Krueger, City Prosecutors Boycott Judge Stirling, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 13, 1995, at B1, B2.
271. Id.
272. REID HASTIE, ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY, supra note 218.
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decision-making by Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, the authors con-
cluded that "as for accuracy on the law comprehension, memory, and
application of the law are major problems for juries. '273
As these two studies suggest, a body of work exists that may, by
implication, give insight in to how juries would perform at answering
pure legal questions. This is the work on exploring the question of
how well jurors comprehend legal instructions. If juries cannot under-
stand the law, then one would expect that given the opportunity, ju-
rors would perform poorly at deciding legal questions. Conversely, if
jurors are adept at comprehending the law, then perhaps legal deci-
sions should be within the province of the jury.
When juries receive legal instructions as part of their decision-
making process, does the infusion of legal knowledge tend to assist or
impair decision-making (i.e., does the jury seem capable of synthesiz-
ing the information to its advantage)?
Complex jury instructions baffle the jurors.274 Simply put, jurors
largely do not comprehend the instructions.275 Using special verdicts
rather than general verdicts somewhat improves juror comprehension,
but overall comprehension may remain poor.276
One relatively thorough study of juror comprehension of legal
instructions was performed by a collaboration of social science re-
searchers from Michigan State University and legal professionals from
273. Id. at 231.
274. Maura Dolan, Why Jurors Err: They're Just Human, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994,
supra note 32, at Al. For a description of a jury struggling with intent, see Laurence J.
Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 198-99 (1984). Judge Jerome Frank wrote, "It is inconceiv-
able that a body of twelve ordinary men, casually gathered together for a few days, could,
merely from listening to the instructions of the judge, gain the knowledge necessary to
grasp the true import of the judge's words. For these words have often acquired their
meaning as the result of hundreds of years of professional disputation in the courts."
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYT' AND REALrrY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 218,
at 116.
275. See David U. Strawn & Raymond iW. Buchanan, Jury confusion: A threat to jus-
tice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 480-83 (1976) (reporting on the results of Florida jurors finding
that jurors may not sufficiently understand the law even after having received instructions);
see also Laurence J. Severance, et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can
Understand, supra note 274, at 206-07 (1984) (reporting on a study finding that people
without legal training have difficulty comprehending standardized jury instructions).
276. See Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury
Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (concluding from a study of mock
jurors that special verdicts may enhance the quality of jury decision-making).
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the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions Committee.277 The study an-
alyzed 600 completed questionnaires of jurors.278 The authors of the
study found the results "discouraging," concluding that comprehen-
sion levels were "quite low," instructions "often had little impact on
comprehension," and sometimes "instructions actually decreased ju-
ror comprehension. '
279
While jurors do not comprehend better as a result of instructions,
jurors will change their verdict in reaction to instructions. 280 Some-
times the change will go towards non-intuitive directions. For exam-
ple, empirical evidence indicates that juries informed of their right to
nullify, give fewer guilty verdicts than uninformed juries, but also give
stiffer sentences in cases where they deliver guilty verdicts.281
In light of the findings on juror comprehension, the sug-
gested course of action by the authors of these studies may be
surprising. The conclusion of the authors usually has not been to
suggest that courts abandon trying to instruct juries, but that they
strive for better instructions.282 Implicit in this conclusion is that if the
277. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury
Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 401, 405 (1990).
278. Id. at 410.
279. Id. at 425. Accord HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 121; E. Allan Lind, The
Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 13, 27-29
(Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982). One writer suggests that to the extent
jurors do present a patina of understanding, it is not a result of lack of comprehension but
rather, of picking up on nonverbal clues from the presiding judge. Note, Darryl Brown,
Judges' Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial Impartiality, 61 VA. L. REV.
1266 (1975).
280. See Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Con-
sequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513, 532-39, 557-60
(1992). Accord Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instructions on Verdicts
and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 25-36 (1985) (conclud-
ing that jury instructions on nullification frequently changed the verdict, as did the form of
the instruction).
281. Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power: The
Nullification Debate 1787-1988, supra note 252, at 172-73 (1991).
282. See, e.g., Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Ju-
rors Can Understand, supra note 274, 207-32 (1984) (reporting on a new set of instructions
the authors find jurors can comprehend); Diamond & Casper, supra note 280, at 559 (argu-
ing that "carefully crafted efforts that both provide jurors with important information and
give them reasons why they ought not to employ it may, indeed, be successful... and that
there may be good policy arguments to prefer [full disclosure] to simple blindfolding.");
Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, The Jury Project 106-07 (1994) (the
"goal should be to produce pattern instructions that will be more understandable by lay
jurors"). Unfortunately, research indicates that often, when social science literature dem-
onstrates the need for reform of jury instructions, legislatures make few changes and courts
often change in the opposite direction. J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Leg-
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instructions are sufficiently clear, the jury will be able to understand
the law. 83
If it is correct that the law can be explained in sufficiently clear
terms that jurors can comprehend it, then the next question-will ju-
rors decide legal issues accurately-may become a moot inquiry. In a
democracy, one of the predominant meanings of "accuracy" of the law
is that the law reflects the will of the community. The jury is the most
democratic representative of the community present in the courtroom.
Arguably, if the beginning premise is that the jurors comprehend the
legal question, then whatever answer the jurors give is the "accurate"
one in a democracy.
Given the state of current research, only limited conclusions can
be drawn about the comparative abilities of judges and juries at decid-
ing pure legal questions. The Founders envisioned this as part of the
province of the jury, but for much of the nation's history, the jury has
been denied this role. The denial rests on the assumption that the law
is too complex for the jury, an assumption supported by some recent
research; yet, the empirical work on jury fact-finding suggests that the
more complex the question, the more desirable the jury is as the deci-
sion-maker. The work on jury instructions suggests jurors do not com-
prehend the legal instructions as currently written, but the researchers
seem to believe that the problem lies with the instructions, not the
jurors. Perhaps, then, the only possible conclusion is that there is in-
sufficient research to conclude either that the jury is capable or inca-
pable of deciding pure legal questions.
(3) Answering Mixed Questions
How do juries perform when confronted with mixed questions of
law and fact? The evidence shows that juries do as well as judges.
The quintessential juncture at which to test this premise is to look at
how juries perform either when deciding whether conduct is reason-
able or deciding whether a defendant is guilty.
The research on how juries perform suggests that juries are doing
relatively well at this task. There is not a large body of work on how
juries do at addressing "reasonableness." Perhaps this is because the
islatures, and Commissions Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 155 (1991).
283. See, eg., The Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of Ju-
ries, Jurors: The Power of 12, at 99-103 (1994) (on file with Federal Judicial Center) (pro-
posing as a jury reform that in all phases of the trial, but especially within legal instructions,




Supreme Court long ago confirmed the constitutionality of leaving
this determination to the jury.284 The conventional wisdom is that the
jury is suited to answer this question just as well as the judge285
Far more work has been done on how juries perform when decid-
ing whether to convict or acquit. In the ground-breaking work of
Kalven and Zeisel, they concluded that there is some disparity be-
tween the way judges and juries decide trials.286 But if we assume that
the "right" answer is a conviction (as many who clamor for restricting
juries do), it is notable that empirical research shows that in felony
trials, juries convict at a much higher rate than judges.287 A contem-
poraneous work confirms "rather convincingly ... that juries convict
more frequently than judges. '288 The author of this work did not con-
clude that this was instructive as to whether judges or juries were do-
ing a better job, but rather, saw jury conviction rates as a
manifestation of an increased political conservatism. 289 Slightly differ-
ent conclusions were reached by John Guinther, who found that juries
had higher conviction rates in felony trials while judges had higher
conviction rates in misdemeanor trials.2 90 Guinther speculates that
the different conviction rates were related not to the politics of the
jury, but to the perception of the defendant regarding whether the
284. See, e.g., International Terminal Operating Co., Inc. v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik
Stoomv. Maats, 393 U.S. 74, 75 (1968) (per curiam); Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 657, 663-64 (1874).
285. Professor Akhil Amar argues:
Often, legislators and judges will properly lay down rules establishing the per se
reasonableness or the per se unreasonableness of certain types of searches and
seizures, much as they lay down rules establishing per se negligence and per se
non-negligence (safe harbors) in tort law. But sometimes reasonableness will call
for a contextual, common sense assessment that defies broad categorization, and
sometimes a jury will be the best body to make this common sense and demo-
cratic assessment.
Akhil R. Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, supra note 51, at 1192. See
also Murphy, supra note 2, at 735-40 (arguing that the facts of just adjudication combined
with institutional attributes of judge and jury should determine how authority is allocated
between judge and jury).
286. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY supra note 196, at
62-63 (1966).
287. Robert T. Roper & Victor E. Flango, Trials Before Judges and Juries, 8 JusT. Sys.
J. 186, 195 (1983).
288. James P. Levine, Jury Toughness: The Impact of Conservatism on Criminal Court
Verdicts, 29 CRIME & DELINO. 71, 77-79 (1983).
289. Id. at 82-85. This conclusion is in accord with the third vision of juries described
above.
290. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 40.
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best chance of acquittal lies with a jury.291 One branch of the research
on conviction/acquittal rates focuses on how juries answer these ques-
tions in political trials, i.e., trials prone to sway the passions of the
jurors. Looking at a set of these trials from the last fifty years, one
author concludes:
My aim has simply been to show how an institution run by ama-
teurs, directed and organized by ordinary people, using their com-
mon sense and following formal rules, can perform its duty in a
consistently responsible manner, how it can stand above popular
prejudice and deliver verdicts that are respected by experts steeped
and trained in the law.292
Another researcher, also focusing on. how juries performed in "polit-
ical" trials, similarly concluded that juries, while unlikely to be fair to
the political dissident on trial, are no worse decision-makers than
judges.293
All in all, it seems that although asking juries to answer mixed
questions causes verdicts that commentators perceive to be unpredict-
able, perhaps unintended, and undesirable,294 no evidence exists to
suggest that judges would do any better. There is a crisis of confi-
dence, but there is no evidence that defaulting the decision-making to
judges would increase the accuracy of verdicts.
(4) A Summary of the Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence is not conclusive, but suggests that
although juries are not perfect, they are relatively as competent as
judges in doing the tasks asked of them.295 As to each task the jury
might perform, there is either evidence that the jury does as well or
better than the judge, or that there is insufficient evidence to draw a
contrary conclusion. Juries are better suited than judges to answer
fact questions, seem to perform at least as well as judges in answering
mixed questions, and as to pure legal questions, the researchers pro-
291. Id. at 40-41; see James P. Brady, Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Me-
dia, and Political Trials, 11 J. oF CRIM. Just 241, 251-60 (1983).
292. Simon, supra note 6, at 291.
293. James P. Brady, Fair and Impartial Railroad. The Jury, The Media, and Political
Trials, 11 J. CRiM. Jusr. supra note 291, at 251-60. This, of course, must be read in the
context of the researcher's conclusions about what is "fair."
294. See Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal
Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project,
supra note 277, at 432-33 (stating there is an inherent tension between legal accuracy and
juror comprehension).
295. In their comprehensive study on juries, Professors Hans and Vidmar concluded
that all three of the major criticisms of juries-incompetence, prejudice, and waging war
with the law-were misplaced. HANs & VMMAR, supra note 11, at 245.
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ceed on the assumption that law is within the grasp of the jury. This
accordingly suggests, albeit not conclusively, that the constituency the-
ory of juries is a viable, perhaps even more accurate, explanation of
the contemporary view of the role of the jury in America.
IlL. The Implications of a Constituency Theory on the Jury
Reform Movements
The larger implication of a constituency theory is that if, as con-
stituency theory suggests, the jury is not overmatched, then the cur-
rent slate of jury reforms are not as attractive or effective. The cost is
the loss of a cornerstone of the original concept of democratic govern-
ment.296 Although restricting the jury's role might save time and
money,297 it will do so by eliminating democratic functions of the jury.
A variety of writers have recognized broadly the link between
juries and democracy. The journalist Paula DiPerna began her book
on the American jury by writing:
The concept of the jury system is as close as any society has ever
come to true democracy. Yet in today's complicated and precarious
world, where competent social decisions require more, not less citi-
zen involvement, the jury system seems a burden. It draws criticism
that is often unrelated to its actual performance and blame for
poorly executed justice.
298
Others make the same point. As one commentator recognized, the
jury is quintessentially the body that has always represented the peo-
ple, and as such, its role is a question "deeply tinged with political
considerations. ,299
Because of the different contexts of each of these writers, few
have fully addressed the consequences of the interrelationship of ju-
ries and democracy. Some writers have recognized the role of the jury
as a democratic institution, but have not drawn any specific conclu-
sions from proposed jury reforms. Others have seen the implications
296. Although this original concept of the jury as a cornerstone of democratic govern-
ment was devised in the context of white, male property owners, democratically empower-
ing diverse juries is not unprecedented; rather, in Saxon times, juries "were democratic,
mixing the washed and unwashed and giving the latter a voice." Barbara Holland, Do you
swear that you will well and truly try... ?, 25 SMITHSONIAN 108, 113-14 (Mar. 1995).
297. See Benjamin Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 A.B.A. J. 950 (1970);
but see Rudloph Janata, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials, 11 FORUM 590, 591-94 (1975)
(arguing that juries are neither too costly nor inefficient).
298. DIPERNA, supra note 11, at 1.
299. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 218 (1898).
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broadly, but have not gone on to look at particular implications for
particular reforms.
Virtually any jury reform has implications on the ability of the
jury to fulfill its democratic function. This can happen in two ways.
First, each reform has the potential of changing the distribution of
power between a democratic institution, the jury, and a non-demo-
cratic one, the judge. There has always been a historical "striving for
power or relative advantage-between judge and jury."300 If the jury
is restricted in its role and power, then that power defaults to the
judge, an instrument of the government.
*Increasing the power of the judge is, by the very nature of the
judiciary, less democratic than increasing the power of juries. For ex-
ample, as of 1992, minority representation in the federal judiciary was
only 1O%.301 In 1993, women comprised 11% of all federal judges.
302
"[T]he modem Bury] system places the judge in a position of vir-
tually absolute authority in the civil courtroom, quite a departure
from the practice of the early days of the Republic. 3 03 A reversal of
this distribution of authority can serve as a means of empowering indi-
vidual, sometimes otherwise marginalized citizens. As Professor
Karst explains:
For the members of a subordinated group, some of the most effec-
tive forms of liberating expression have almost nothing to do with
reason or deliberation, but a lot to do with participating in public
life. Their participation tells them (and tells others) that their opin-
ions count, that they are full members of the polity.3 04  I
Each proposal for jury reform bears examination for its effects on the
power distribution between the judge and jury.
Second, each reform has the potential of changing the mix of
voices in the jury box, or changing the range of subjects that those
voices may discuss. The jury could not be truly representative as long
as it was elite. Now that the jury is no longer elite, it truly can be
democratic. Indeed, in our increasingly anonymous society, juries are
one of the rare civic settings, imperfect though it may be, where mem-
bers of the same community, strangers to each other, get to talk
300. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 305 (3d
ed. 1985).
301. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American
Experience and the South African Challenge, 42 DuKE L.J. 1028, 1067 (1993).
302. Comment, Diversifying the Judiciary: The Influence of Gender and Race on Judg-
ing, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 179, 204 (1994).
303. Dooley, supra note 5, at 334.
304. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of
Groups, supra note 3, at 122.
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among themselves about issues of importance to all-the kind of in-
teraction so critical to grassroots democracy.305 The potential destruc-
tion of this forum should not be dealt with lightly. "Knowledge
emerges from community discussion and consensus. '30 6 Each propo-
sal to reform the jury should be measured to see whether it silences or
empowers more voices.
Each of the democratic jury functions the Founders enunciated
can be divided into these two categories. Judge/jury power allocations
are manifested in the hopes for the jury as a bulwark against tyranni-
cal government, a check on a judge's power, and a guard against cor-
ruption. The mix of voices in the jury box, and the range of topics the
jury may discuss, are manifested in the hopes for the jury as a school
for citizens to learn self-government, a forum for citizens to decide the
direction of community values, a vehicle for self-governance, and an
opportunity for citizens to reject inappropriate application of the law.
Each jury reform can be measured against this two-prong democ-
racy test. Special verdicts and fact verdicts provide the most obvious
issues. These devices blatantly shift power and directly silence the
jury's discussion of certain issues.
Peremptory challenges are also both empowering to the judge
and invasive of democratic dialogue. Peremptory challenges empower
the judge, and disempower jury, because the restrictions on race or
gender-based strikes307 empower the judge to impose his or her own
vision as the criterion for the make-up of the jury.308 The judge can
decide when the strikes have evinced a pattern that the judge sees as
discriminatory. The judge's vision, whatever it is, will disempower the
jury to the extent the jury is less cross-sectional of the community as a
whole. Peremptory strikes weaken the democratic dialogue because
305. See ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 2 ("the jury version of democracy stands almost
alone today in entrusting the people at large with the power of government").
306. Ronald J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the Theory of the Right To Trial By Jury,
supra note 245, at 38 (comparing the different basis of judge and jury knowledge and as-
serting that jury knowledge comes from group interaction).
307. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419, 1421 (1994).
308. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, Mixed Jury Picked to Try Policeman, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1993, at A6 (reporting on the judge's intent "to seat blacks on the jury 'to the maximum
extent permitted by law"'). There is also a power shift from the lawyers to the judge.
Marder, supra note 5, at 1088-90. For example, a consequence of the Batson line of cases
concerning improper use of peremptories may be the encouragement to judges to liberally
use the power to entirely strike a jury panel as "grossly unrepresentative." See The Ari-
zona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of Juries, Jurors: The Power of 12,
supra note 283, at 44 (1994) (on file with Federal Judicial Center) (proposing this course of
action by judges).
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they have the effect of excluding perspectives, reducing the range of
views, and thus making the deliberations "less reflective of the
community. ' 309
A jury of six rather than twelve not only draws on fewer in the
community to engage in the process, it also makes the jury less repre-
sentative of the community; thus it silences voices.310 A six-person
jury will more often deliver an odd or shocking verdict-and thus a
verdict less likely to be representative of the community's con-
science.3 1' Six-person juries are much more likely to deviate from ex-
pected verdict ranges and are all-in-all harmful to the ideal of diverse,
democratic deliberation.
3 12
Nonunanimous verdicts silence voices. The twelve-member
unanimous jury "offers a far greater possibility for effective represen-
tation" of minority viewpoints.313 It also provides greater legitimacy
to verdicts.314
Elimination of attorney-conducted voir dire, a reform that one
would intuitively think would increase the community representative-
ness of the jury, may also have the negative result of silencing voices.
An empirical study on the subject concludes that when the judge con-
ducts voir dire, the jurors end up conforming to the perceived prefer-
ences of the judge.315
Capping damages is a dramatic redistribution of power and an
incursion into the range of topics of discussion in the jury room. In
this sense, damage caps, a restriction on the civil jury, are undemo-
cratic shifts in the "fundamental distribution of power in society.
'316
309. Marder, supra note 5, at 1063-66.
310. Hans Zeisel, The Verdict of Five out of Six Civil Jurors: Constitutional Problems,
supra note 226, at 145-47 (1982).
311. Victor J. Baum, The Six-Man Jury-The Cross Section Aborted, 12 JUDGES' J. 12,
12-13 (1973).
312. Hans Zeisel,... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,
supra note 203, at 715-20.
313. Hans Zeisel, The Verdict of Five out of Six Civil Jurors: Constitutional Problems,
supra note 226, at 149-50.
314. Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy-Making: The Role of the Jury,
supra note 264, at 88 (1977).
315. Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Inves-
tigation of Juror Candor, supra note 233, at 142-45 (1987).
316. Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh
Amendment and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 224 (1991). Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that juries do not reward plaintiffs excessively, but rather, are
skeptical and conservative in reaching liability and damage decisions. William S. Lofquist
& Valerie P. Hans, The Civil Jury Decides, 6 Or. MANAGER 19. (Summer 1991). Yet, if
these damage caps are imposed legislatively, this complicates the conclusion that they are
anti-democratic.
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The original jury embodied direct democracy.317 The jury was the
best example of government of the people, by the people, and for the
people. This concept of the jury led to the jury's enshrinement in the
Constitution, and therefore, it would be this concept of the jury, if
any, that has Constitutional stature.
Today's pressure for reform puts to the test how much esteem we
really hold in the democratic ideal. "Long ago, Aristotle suggested
that democracy's chief virtue was the way it permitted ordinary per-
sons drawn from different walks of life to achieve a 'collective wis-
dom' that none could achieve alone. ' 318 Are we willing to trust this
collective wisdom when the collection includes people different from
ourselves, or do we believe that the problem with democracy is that
the wrong people vote?319
The irony is that making the jury more democratic may be the
catalyst in the demise of the jury as a democratic institution. In this
respect, juries exemplify an incongruity Professor Kenneth Karst has
been exploring in American society, the "incongruity between [our]
egalitarian ideals and [our] behavior. '320
As Professor Jeffrey Abramson says in his book, "[t]rial by jury is
about the best of democracy and about the worst in democracy... ;" it
exposes "the full range of democratic vices and virtues."' 321 The time
has come to squarely face this role of the jury and to decide what it
means about our commitment to democracy. We should not casually
and inattentively cause fundamental change to the structure of gov-
ernment. Yet that is what the current movement for jury reform does
by not including in the discussion the implications for a democratic
form of government. It may be that direct democracy is not as attrac-
tive to contemporary Americans in light of the heterogeneity of the
nation. But that is a decision that should be made intentionally, not
under the cloak of something else.
317. The populace can influence the Legislature or Executive through voting, but jury
influence over the Judiciary is far more direct than influencing the selection of the judge.
See Letters from the Federal Farmer (XV), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 58, at 315, 320 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981).
318. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 11.
319. The early Americans never had to actually put their rhetoric to the test. In a
society where the voices and the jury were largely heterogeneous, there was minimal risk
to empowering the jury. Now, unless something like the old vision of the jury is revived,
the democratic functions of the jury will be lost.
320. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, supra note 3, at 2.
321. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 1.
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Conclusion
Times and views change. At this nation's nascent stage, the jury
was commonly viewed as an institution manifesting rights of citizens
as jurors, and as such was inviolate. Contemporary views seemed to
have changed, and the jury is now perceived as an anachronism hin-
dering the achievement of community goals. Juries are now seen as an
irrational, unpredictable, and incompetent institution, and as a dispen-
sable institution at that.
This change in views has largely come about because of the
change in who has voice in our society. But the public discussion
about juries has been slow to explicitly recognize that diversity is re-
sponsible for the current distrust. As a result, the democratic ideal the
jury was intended to institutionalize is now at risk from a series of jury
reforms that do not take the ideal into account.
As a starting point, in answering whether we can improve juries,
we must begin with the discussion of what we want our juries to
achieve. If the goal is accuracy, further jury reform would likely
achieve at best incremental improvement, a gain that simultaneously
would cause the loss of the other roles that juries can serve. It may be
that those roles, though noble aspirations, turned out over time to be
unachievable, at least through the vehicle of juries. If so, then there is
no great loss. It may also be that those roles are no longer the goals
we care about. Again, if so, there is no great loss. But we should go
about jury reform with our eyes open. This should be an informed
choice.
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